

The Rise of a Global God-Image? Spiritual internationalists, the international left and the idea of human progress

SEBASTIAN JOB

ABSTRACT For a period that endured so long it came to seem coextensive with Western modernity, durable barriers stood between those who sought political liberation and those who sought spiritual liberation. We are now emerging from that period. The barriers never operated in the same way or to the same extent in all countries, for much the same reason that 'secularism' differed in its effective meaning from country to country. But even in secularism's Anglo-European heartland the division between spirit and politics no longer feels self-evident. This shift cannot help but resonate throughout progressive politics. What we lack are conceptual means for illuminating the shift. The progressive spiritual-political terrain will hardly come into view if it is conceived only in terms of mutual concerns, or shared ethical values, or common campaign work. Pragmatic considerations must be grounded in conceptions of the current world process. Conceptions of the world process must be capable of generating new and fertile responses to many of the deep moral and metaphysical questions which become more insistent in times of rapid—not to say cataclysmic—change. Only in this way can 'progressive social forces', whether belonging to the tradition of the left or to spiritual and religious traditions, help to open up the human vista at a time when 'progress' is pursued nearly everywhere in its narrowest and most lethal forms. This article takes up these issues, emphasising the need for a reorientation of political thought in the face of a world scene stalked by apocalyptic anxieties. The best child of these anxieties may well be an internationally integrative structure which we can refer to as a 'progressive global God-image'. Putting forward this idea as an interpretive key both to the possibilities inherent in the progressive spiritual-political encounter and to important aspects of the contemporary planetary situation, the idea is then illustrated by summarising the key claims of a specific group of 'spiritual internationalists'. In conclusion I suggest that, in so far as the spiritual-political encounter is not joined, contemporary progressives of a spiritual and a traditional leftist kind will continue to represent two forms of

*Sebastian Job is in the Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
Email: sebastian.job@usyd.edu.au.*

'unhappy consciousness'. The option that beckons, meanwhile, is for each to discover in the other the resources they need to creatively respond to their own limitations.

Politically the present era lacks dominant lines of division. Across the globe political schisms proliferate. Ruling classes within many powerful nation-states are internally divided: military-industrial elites, clustered in regional power blocs, set themselves against 'soft' politicians under pressure from populations hoping for peace, and against fractions of capital resentful of limitations to cross-border trade created by military conflicts. Transnational corporations and security apparatuses contend with landless peasants, indigenous peoples, militant trade unions and anarchists forced to employ the anonymity of balaclavas. Fundamentalist religious movements conspire with Washington's hypocritical 'war on terror' to inspire increasing numbers of cadres dedicated to victory over secular modernity. Race warriors outbid cultural conservatives and confused liberals in responding to unstoppable flows of immigrants and refugees. Unemployed migrant youth in cities from Paris to San Salvador opt for the anti-political politics of gang life. Developing countries in Asia, Eurasia the Middle East and Latin America challenge the older centres of capital accumulation. Irredentist movements seize their chances against weakened nation-states. Those who produce food are bedevilled by those who would privatise, biotechnologise and otherwise monopolise its control. Energy- or water-rich countries arm themselves against predators hungry for scarce resources. Each country stands on guard against virtually every other while opportunistically trading weapons systems left, right and centre. Everywhere the ecologically alarmed look with despair upon the ecologically complacent.

Meanwhile, a complex universal operates in all the hostile particularisation. Interlacing itself with the techno-scientific juggernaut, with endless variation of commodity production, with unlimited imagistic representation aimed at aggravating consumer desire, and with bloated militaries floating on nationalistic ideologies, capital accumulation is that which now passes, to paraphrase Theodor Adorno, as the real World Spirit.¹ Yet it is a really sick World Spirit. The flagship organisations of corporate-led global integration, the IMF and World Trade Organization (WTO), have lost much of their authority. Even before going into financial meltdown, the relative economic decline and military overreach of the neoliberal powerhouse, the USA, had helped turn a once triumphalist doctrine into what the Filipino sociologist Walden Bello called 'neoliberal pragmatism': a default policy orientation of technocratic elites ready to abandon economic dogma with the shifting of political winds.²

The US financial crisis may well bring the world economy to its knees. All the same there is no socioeconomic alternative to take its place. Neoliberal assumptions are suddenly lampooned even at an elite level, but this represents no more than an opening, a possibility. Capitalism, which has seen off its secular and modernist ideological competitors on the right and

left, still has most of the planet within its horizonless grip. But the fact that it dominates the scene doesn't make it any more capable in the face of the problems it creates or exacerbates. As a result, capitalist culture's foremost product is actually a sense of collective helplessness. On the one hand, nothing serious can be done about nuclear proliferation, or the weaponisation of space, or the loss of habitats for disappearing species, or the pollution of every animal, vegetable and mineral, or the rising temperature of the atmosphere, or resource depletion, or the melting of the ice caps, or the causes of terrorism, or financial instability and economic vulnerability, or skyrocketing inequalities of wealth and income, or the corruption of scientific and moral values by commodity values, or the saturation of the media with celebrity vapidness, or the brittle 'happiness' produced by enslavement to the panacea of 'more', or the creation of whole populations surplus to the market's requirements. On the other hand, There is *Still* No Alternative.

The situation we are describing is felt acutely even in Western countries. Here many are beginning to wonder whether Spengler's old prophecy about their decline has finally caught up with them. It doesn't help that today the West is rather less well insulated from both the sufferings and the triumphs of the rest. However, the 'provincialising' of the European-cum-American metropole cannot help but be a signal moment in the intellectual and eventually the existential life of every other culture.³ One of its signs is that parallel to the quotidian world of breezy business deals, spin-doctored pseudo-democratic politics, human rights discourses and security obsessions, the West is becoming infected by a truly catastrophic *Weltstimmung*. That is to say, today the West exports not only a technophilic, hubristic can-doism peppered with a sometimes genuine will to freedom and equality, but also a world mood patently haunted by the archetype of the apocalypse.⁴

There should be few surprises here. If the high gloss of commodity culture is naturally shadowed by dark presentiments of 'the end', this is the result of successful efforts to naturalise the ruling socioeconomic order as a system without end. Fredric Jameson nailed the situation when he observed that 'It seems to be easier for us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late capitalism.'⁵ Even in the tabloid media of wealthy countries there is talk of 'doomsday', of the dire imperative to 'save the planet', and of the need for 'revolutionary changes'. All the same the warnings come spliced between advertisements for smiley lives in Gadgetville and the revolutionary changes are yet to find their revolutionaries. Despite a widespread sense of a small globe coming apart, the biggest split remains the one between politically active minorities and habitually disengaged masses. Evidently in most locales the pressure for a new path is yet to recognise itself in a governing idea, let alone a spark of hope, a programme, or an ethic of struggle.

The upshot is that a strictly social scientific analysis will hardly encompass the current situation. As the confused debate about religion and secularism indicates, basic politico-metaphysical dilemmas now intrude—as dilemmas—into popular consciousness. The questions are not just: 'How—given fundamental differences, given staggering inequalities, given pressing

ecological finitude, given anxiety about *mass collective death*—are we to address our problems and live together?; ‘What must we change?; and ‘On what basis?’. These questions also blend into: ‘What, after all, do we share?’ and thus finally: ‘Who are we?’. Mark well the urgent uprush of this global ‘we’—a ‘we’ in search of more than a social or cultural definition, yet which remains entirely uncertain of itself. Heedless of phobias about ‘totalising’ thought, this uprush is precisely a hankering for the universal. It keeps asking how, embraced by which inclusive One, can the fantastically diverse Many of the world get themselves into focus, work out what is ending and what is beginning, and make a better go of it? Mark, too, the way questions that have always smouldered quietly beneath propositions about, and programmes for, ‘progress’, ‘peace’ and ‘development’, questions concerning the meaning of human being, of the human good, of the relation between the historical and the cosmological, the temporal and the eternal, are now beginning to flare again. They will not be dampened by new recipes for financial success. They will not be smothered by ‘anti-essentialist’ echolalia from the humanities and social sciences. They will not be drowned out by neo-Darwinian speculations about selfish genes trumped by selfish memes. They will not even be swamped by dogmatic belief in sacred texts and unquestioned support for religious authority. Not totally.

But just because there are so many fracture lines and so much at stake does not mean that simple calls for human unity stand much chance of helping matters. Politics is inescapably about division as well as unity. Even those who conceive their task as one of ‘integration’ must either recognise the living sources of acrimonious division and respond by trying to outmanoeuvre them, or must cross themselves out as political actors. The question of which divisions should count as the basic ones for progressive political action therefore comes to the forefront.

It would be an error to regard this as simply an empirical question. Humans are self-interpreting and self-justifying creatures and political facts are co-composed by the forms of thought which symbolise them.⁶ The problem, then, with conceiving of the fundamental axis of world politics in terms of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ is not simply that it is empirically ill-conceived. It is equally that, in capturing the imagination of masses of ‘opinion makers’ on all sides, clashes between those who construe themselves in civilisational terms are amplified. The measure of the success of the theory becomes at the same time the measure of our common descent into Hell. By the same token critical observations could also be extended to more meritorious ways of drawing the world political map (the North–South divide; class divisions; authoritarian regimes and movements versus democratic ones; capitalist institutions versus socialist impulses, etc). For different reasons, none of these will do on their own.

So, where must the world turn if it is to turn from the abyss? Let us first observe that this giant, mocking question is posed to those fighting for equal, free and just social relations. That is, it is posed to those belonging to the tradition, stretching back thousands of years, of the struggle for human liberation.⁷ Whether their primary focus be local, national, regional or

global, let us call them the international left. For them the essential question concerning the fate of the world leads on to others. How, in this long post-Soviet hour of reflection and reconstitution, should progressive forces understand their basic orientation? What are the overarching co-ordinates by which they might comprehend their essential tasks, their historic weaknesses, their long-term alliances, their reasons for being?

But is the left the only progressive social force taking up the essential question of human survival and human flourishing in a radical way? The problem of finding an exit from the dark times into which the world is flinging itself is posed to other groups. Importantly it is posed to spiritual and religious people who find the planet they care for under fundamental threat and who find they cannot make their peace with how the planet is run. These people are the inheritors of traditions, thousands of years in the making, of wisdom, reverence and religious illumination. Whatever their area of engagement, let us call them the spiritual internationalists. Here too there arise for such people questions concerning their responsibilities, their difficulties in thinking sociologically, their relation to politics, their essential sympathies.

This article takes up the relationship between progressive spirituality and progressive politics. The terms of that relationship, mobile as they have been in different cultural and national contexts, now appear to be loosening up. We may be on the threshold of a historic convergence; at the very least, a new conversation between those oriented to transcendental meaning and those oriented to fundamental social change. And the promise, for those involved in this growing interaction, already seems large. The wager at its largest might be the one expressed at a conference in 2005 to set up a Network of Spiritual Progressives in America. The California prison activist and green jobs organiser Van Jones put it this way: 'It is in the convergence of spiritual people becoming active, and active people becoming spiritual, that the hope of humanity now rests'.⁸

Discussion has begun, or rather has re-begun,⁹ but we still lack a vocabulary capable of mapping out the conceptual ground of this potential convergence. How to begin to think about its pitfalls and its possibilities? On the basis of what shared understanding would these distinct traditions approach each other, and against whom or what would they be commonly arraigned? How, at the same time, to work up common concepts for these tasks which would be maximally fertile within different cultures and traditions? We see that these questions, already complex enough, flow into the more fundamental one concerning the fortunes of the world, and which we might now put like this: what existing fracture lines *must* be exacerbated if humanity is to stand a chance of rejuvenating itself? Let us consider the hypothesis that much of the contemporary cultural and political ferment in developed and less developed countries alike speaks to a widespread if often unconscious desire to move beyond the limitations of secular self-understandings, yet without abandoning secular society's gains, whether these be actual or potential. In this context, and at the risk of howls from already bruised atheists, I want to put the case that the essential political split will be

the more fruitful the more it has its roots in rival trans-cultural, trans-religious, trans-ideological *God-images*. More precisely my contention is that a revealing way to think about the most basic global fault line, the essential division between the healthy forces of rejuvenation and the malignant forces driving us further into injustice and destruction, is to conceive it as between those secular, spiritual and religious people committed or contributing, consciously or not, to a *progressive global God-image*, and those secular, spiritual and religious people who, consciously or not, are its committed enemies.¹⁰

Whether, and to what extent, this postulated progressive global God-image is already at work in different cultural, national and civilisational contexts, and is already shepherding into being a new spiritual-political convergence, is a multifaceted and fast moving empirical question. Much the same may be said concerning the various enemies of this God-image. The current article is exploratory and has a different purpose. The key problem is to help orient political analysis by airing an approach open to the profound metaphysical challenges inherent in our current predicament. The concept of a progressive global God-image is no substitute for other, often more immediately pressing, forms of political analysis and orientation. Rather, it aims to throw light on what might be at stake in those political inquiries.¹¹

Concerning ‘God-images’

The term ‘God-image’ derives from the *imago Dei* of the Christian Church fathers. Together with cross-cultural material ranging from alchemy to Vedanta conceptions of the *Atman* or Self as *Brahman* or transcendent reality, this heritage informs the Jungian metapsychology which has attempted to codify the idea. Understood in depth psychological terms, whatever else Gods may or may not be, they certainly exist as images within the human psyche. Thanks to their felt intensity, their often profound significance for the individual, and their utilisation of culturally shared motifs, Jung conceived these God-images as indistinguishable in practice from what he called the archetypal Self. This is a layer of the collective psyche operating within the individual psyche, but far exceeding the conscious ego. Known in symbols of wholeness, and uniting apparently incompatible psychological qualities, the Self operates at a supra-logical or sub-logical level to omnivorously recognise itself in all salient phenomena. As such, God-images give form and expression, always in culturally and historically enabled ways, to that which anchors a person’s ultimate ontological commitments, their account of ultimate purposes, and their intuitions concerning the essential meaning of their own existence.¹²

All this is less than familiar in the modern West, above all because of the long creative decomposition of the Western Judeo-Christian God-image, with its dispersal of limited qualities previously attributed to the divine One through numerous political, scientific and economic realms.¹³ Asked to locate themselves in what the Marxist Catholic sociologist Douglas Porpora calls ‘metaphysical space’, most contemporary Americans, and, we might

safely add, most Westerners in general, are at a loss. They have no intersubjectively verifiable conceptions of the ultimate and the essential.¹⁴ But this hardly means that metaphysical space itself is content to vegetate. By referring to this domain in psycho-cultural terms we thicken it, existentially speaking. Now it is comprehended as something with an unconscious and collective dynamic of its own. Keeping this fact before our eyes seems necessary even when, as in the present case, the analysis must be largely limited to the conscious realm.

Note that merely by speaking of ‘God-images’, we do *not* prejudice theological debates. We do not pretend to legislate to atheists that they must start to believe in God, or even in Jung. But we do make some assumptions. First, the most literal kind of ‘images’ of God extend from church icons to ritual dances, holy temples, sacred sites and exemplary prophetic individuals. Second, these literal images testify, along with many quotidian aspects of social life, to collectively shared and predominantly unconscious conceptions of ‘what ultimately is’, of ‘what and who finally matters’, and of ‘how to live’. Third, such ‘ultimate conceptions’ must be accounted as powerful psycho-cultural forces: they are the home of many primary human fantasies, and as such they exert an influence on, and subjectively ground and energise, ideological commitments. Fourth, ultimate conceptions are so frequently crystallised in images of Gods that it is convenient to also speak of them as ‘God-images’, it being understood that this is shorthand for something like ‘un/conscious, individual and cultural representations of ultimate ontological–existential quiddity and significance’. Fifth, these more or less unconscious God-images not only vary greatly between different religions and cultures, they also have specific histories, co-evolving, at their own speeds, with the faster moving social and political changes they foster and hinder. Sixth, such images differ considerably in their noetic, ethical and political consequences—so at least on pragmatic grounds it behoves atheist progressives to know something about them and to co-operate where possible with those believers they judge to be, in specific contexts, ‘on the same side’.

While we are considering these epistemologically agnostic entry points to the discussion, some reassurance may also be extended to believers. In their case it may be said that to make any number of psychological and historicising points about God-images is hardly to presume that they have no warrant to speak of their own belief in the Christian God Himself, or their sincere worship of a specific selection of Hindu Gods, or their certain conviction of the veracity of the Koran. That is to say, the beginning point here is not an impetuous demand that each believer consent to make do with a pale copy: the ‘mere image’. What *is* presumed of each believer is a self-differentiating capacity such that their ‘sacred truth’ is *also* understood by them to exist legitimately for many others as a ‘subjective conviction’, or as ‘one tradition among others’, in any event as a particular, historically and culturally mediated image of (a supposed) God. Without this capacity for punctual objectification of one’s beliefs, the distance between ‘image’ and ‘God’ crudely collapses and empathetic identification with non-believing interlocutors goes out of the window.

These considerations belong to the methodology of the sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis of religion. By ‘bracketing’ the truth status of any specific claim concerning the numinous realms, social scientific, phenomenological and psychological discussion becomes possible.¹⁵ In my view this methodological moment remains a permanent necessity. Ultimately, however, it is not a matter of seeking simple descriptive adequacy concerning an external phenomenon, or even a ‘convenient’ *lingua franca* for a hoped-for spiritual–political discussion. The idea not of ‘God-images’ in general, but of a specifically *progressive* and *global* God-image, relates not only to an image ‘out there’ in the psycho-cultural landscape, but to something that, to the extent that its qualities are appreciated, does not allow itself to remain a mere ‘object’ of study. Put otherwise, the specific logic of the image disturbs the quintessentially modern opposition between (social scientific, phenomenological, etc) ‘knowledge’ and (spiritual–religious) ‘belief’. If it were to respect that opposition to the end, it could not be the harbinger of a new world, since that world, *to be qualitatively new in a progressive sense*, must needs be one in which the condition of humanity, antagonistically split between knowledge and belief—and *inter alia* between science and religion, objective truths and subjective convictions, universal freedoms and cultural particularities—decisively reintegrates itself by reference to a different revelation of being.

The holding of such elements in unreconciled opposition is, as we know, a constituent component of modern thought and practical life.¹⁶ That which knits them together therefore necessarily presents itself as a new perspective on human temporality, since it cannot maintain without qualification the founding opposition between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ which defines modernity to itself. By the same token the idea of progress, popularly formulated in terms of movement away from primitive cultural beginnings, also changes. This can be specified further. The progressive global God-image does not and cannot respect to the end the post-Humean opposition between facts and values. More broadly it cannot respect to the end the modern opposition between objective reason and ethico-political conviction. Any social scientific attempt to neutralise the ethical and political implications this God-image underwrites comes up against the logic of the image, for it is set on revealing these as implications of *the reasons employed by the social sciences themselves*. It answers, in a parallel way, to a demand that goes beyond the usual handwringing to the effect that the runaway train of modern techno-scientific development must somehow be forced to take account of human and ecological values. It silently under labours, rather, for sciences which *must be* morally or ethically more developed in order to develop further *as sciences*. In a similar manner it points to the necessity of addressing inequalities of wealth, knowledge, power and respect, whether between classes, sexes, sexualities, races, or metropolises and peripheries. And it does so not simply as matters of social justice, and not simply as likely conditions for human survival, but as collective conditions for more consciously becoming what humanity truly *is*.

Consequently, when we come to speak of the progressive global God-image, we do not deal with a ‘neutral’ ontological, theological or

ethico-political ground as a basis for discussion. That ground does not exist, and were it to be artificially insisted on it would be sterile. Instead, the common framework for engagement between spiritual and political progressives must be that which is prodding the engagement into being; something already active in the trans-cultural unconscious, a counter-systemic component of the general *Zeitgeist*, fertile with still undeployed potential for productively addressing the fundamental cultural, existential and political challenges facing humanity. It is only on some such basis that the framework for discussion can imply a new appreciation of our general situation. Only on some such basis do we stand a chance of illuminating the present morass from a standpoint transcending it.

The 'utopian' character of these qualities might seem to be the kiss of death for this image, at least as regards any realistic expectation of its actual effectiveness in the world. If 'God-images' refer us in the first instance to religions, then the world religious map over the past few decades reveals a less edifying picture: the prosperity gospel of the evangelical expansion in the Americas and the Philippines; the religious nationalism of Orthodox and Catholic revivals in ex-Communist countries; the ongoing tussle over the legacy of Vatican II in Catholic lands; Islamist politico-religious projects active from the Middle East, North and West Africa right through to Central Asia, China, Southeast Asia and even the USA's own Nation of Islam; the communalist violence between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians in India; the conflicts between Buddhists and minority indigenous religions in Thailand and Burma; the intra-Buddhist conflicts in Burma and Sri Lanka; the schism in the Anglican church led by Africans in alliance with First World conservatives.¹⁷ The least that can be conceded is that the more familiar God-images—and conservative, orthodox, traditionalist and fundamentalist ones in particular—are now politically activated to a far greater extent.¹⁸

But it should be emphasised that to speak of a progressive global God-image is to refer to a meta-level conception. Not meta-level in the sense of referring us to even the slightest likelihood, let alone the desirability, of 'One God for One World', but meta-level rather in the sense of a tendency which is present, where it *is* present, within specific secular, religious and spiritual traditions, and which grows in the always particular soil generated by those traditions. Cross-fertilisations of many kinds, on the other hand, are also key parts of the picture. In this context it seems unlikely that what Trotsky used to call the 'combined and uneven development' of the planetary system should be restricted to integrations occurring at military, financial, economic, technological, political and informational levels. Alongside these dynamics attention should also be paid to archetypal integrations within the human collective unconscious, particularly in relation to what Paul Tillich used to call matters of 'ultimate concern'.

A form of spiritual internationalism

Let us now turn to one group of 'spiritual internationalists'. The journal *Kosmos*, and its predecessor *Spirituality and Reality*, are taken as a point of

reference. Deriving their main inspiration from integral philosophical and transpersonal psychological sources,¹⁹ these journals' authors and their respective organisations answer to our description in so far as the problematics of the global 'we' are their cardinal concern.

In Tokyo in November 2005 organisations such as Japan's Goi Peace Foundation, the World Wisdom Council, the Gorbachev Foundation, the Budapest Club, the Future 500, the World Commission on Global Consciousness and Spirituality, the World Spirit Youth Council and Pathways to Peace, along with some 5000 attendees, pledged themselves to building 'a global network of solidarity' oriented to the goal of a 'new planetary civilisation'. A subsequent international gathering was held in September–December 2007 in Monterey, Mexico. Drawing disproportionately on that strand in US and more generally Western culture which was ready to actually learn something from 11 September 2001, these are people roughly construable as fitting the sociologist Ronald Inglehart's 'post-materialist' profile.²⁰ Although we currently lack the ethnographic materials which could provide insight into the specific group un/conscious in this case, it may not be unfair also to indicate their likely location in terms of Lawrence Kohlberg's post-Piagetian theory of moral development. Here (granting them what they would appear to claim for themselves), we might suggest that they fall within Kohlberg's now defunct sixth and highest stage, the one characterised by 'universal ethical principles'.²¹

The basic idea shared by this culturally cosmopolitan fraction of the world's educated elite is that a globalised world has no prospect of remaining liveable for any of us, let alone becoming just and peaceful for all, without a thoroughgoing spiritual revolution. Galvanised from numerous sources by a sense of impending planetary crisis, they unite around the conviction that our problems, to echo a famous observation by Einstein, will not be solved at the same level of consciousness responsible for generating them. As to means, the guiding conception of political change in these circles appears to be a hope that a 'critical mass' of relatively enlightened, openhearted and influential people can produce a cascading consciousness-raising effect through each society's culture and social institutions. This effect can be brought about, they aver, without these 'global citizens' being forced to become politically, culturally or religiously partisan.

Sustained by an apparent reconciliation between, on the one hand, 'leading edge' trends within many branches of natural science and, on the other, the spiritual and religious intuitions of numerous faiths emphasising universal interconnectedness,²² the new ways of seeing and acting, they suggest, have already begun to show themselves. The campaign in the USA for a Global Marshall Plan and for a new Spiritual Bottom Line for corporations and public institutions; the Prague Declaration on Humanising Globalisation; the adoption of the Earth Charter by thousands of cities, municipalities, NGOs and forums around the world; the 'Millennium Campaign' to pressure governments and corporations to follow through on anti-poverty and development commitments; the 'apostasy' of leading mainstream economists like Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman; the large

demonstrations in some 80 countries against the invasion of Iraq; these and many other changes are enumerated as evidence that the necessary planetary shift is at least underway.

Situated somewhat uncertainly between the often revolutionary 'counter-globalisation' activists pushing from below and reform-minded corporate leaders responding above, these spiritual internationalists, though able to command certain institutional resources, are still marginal to political life. Whether they, in particular, will be confined to fretful commentary on the world process is not our present concern. Without attempting a critical evaluation, it is simply a few of the ideas circulating in this movement that will now be outlined. Each of these refers to a dimension of universality, whether negative or positive.

The idea which comes first in a causal sense has already been referred to under the rubric of the 'archetype of the apocalypse'. This operates as the great negative universal, for the threat of global catastrophe is understood as the imposition of an all-embracing collective fate. Here is a characteristic statement from the November 2005 Tokyo Declaration of the World Wisdom Council:

accelerating dysfunctional trends and patterns in all aspects of life threaten our sustainability and very existence on this planet ... these diverse trends and patterns have reached a dangerous tipping point that may precipitate in the coming years a catastrophic collapse and implosion of our economic, political, social, ecological and cultural structures and institutions.²³

If it is granted that statements of this kind, common enough these days, are relatively sober assessments of an admittedly always dimly perceived future, why speak here of 'archetypes' or the 'unconscious'? Because even a statement which is true and knows itself to be so does not thereby cut its ties to unconscious depths. This becomes very obvious in the ideas, congruent with fantasies of omnipotence, sometimes called upon to summon courage for the gargantuan tasks ahead. 'We are living in the most critical moment that the world has ever known', writes Masami Saionji, Chair of the Goi Peace Foundation. All the same, 'By shifting from negative thinking to positive intentions and by holding joy and gratitude in our hearts at all times, we can heal ourselves and bring forward our ability to accomplish anything'.²⁴

At a political level the primary political contradiction these people see is between the global scale of the problems threatening the human race and the national parochialism of political systems and governmental responses. As Mikhail Gorbachev notes, despite decades of international forums on critical ecological and resource consumption issues, little or nothing has been done 'because developed countries block decisions at international forums'. Similarly, efforts to reform the United Nations, or to come up with an international system capable of really driving change, are thwarted because they are 'viewed from the perspective of national interests'.²⁵

Indeed, the predominant attitude in Russia today towards Gorbachev's own attempt, during the days of *perestroika*, to consider the interests of the

Soviet state through the prism of ‘common human values’, would seem to illustrate his point. As the policy that opened the way for the devastation of Russian society and Russian national interests, it is viewed as straightforwardly traitorous. Notwithstanding disenchanting precedents of this order, these spiritual internationalists are interested in the prospects for a ‘*perestroika* of the earth as a whole’. For, whatever the results of the first *perestroika*, patently we are forced, by the unintended consequences of our own social organisation, to restructure our ways of living together. Hence the rallying cry of a ‘new planetary civilisation’—a call which seems partly an assessment of existing trends, partly a project for a new universal political framework, and partly a matter of hope. As for the concrete forces inspiring that hope, these are conscientious ‘world leaders’, NGOs, spiritually and socially conscious business organisations, ‘global civil society’, and, above all, awakened individuals. It would be misleading, however, to imply unity of opinion concerning some of these forces. In the one issue of *Kosmos*, for example, it is possible to read Rinaldo Brutoco, president of the World Business Academy, informing us that ‘The truth is that what is good for business is what is good for people and the planet’, while Nicanor Perlas, founder of the Centre for Alternative Development Initiatives, and with a more activist background in the Philippines, speaks of ‘the deathly grip of neoliberal capitalism’, and tells us that ‘the materialist modernity that governs the world’ is typified by a USA which ‘now seeks to impose a global empire’.²⁶

Within this general context, two further positive universals operate, one metaphysical, the other existential. These integral thinkers are quite clear that generalised national parochialism is not simply a reflection of ‘hard geopolitical realities’, but a co-generator of those realities. Likewise, at the intellectual level a whole series of sources, from neo-Darwinian evolutionary psychology to neo-Hobbesian and neo-Machiavellian political science, conspire to generate what understands itself as sober realism based on a striving for pre-emptive mastery. The response from the proponents of a new civilization is two-fold. First, they argue that these established ideas misunderstand their own basic concept of ‘self-interest’, for in a globalised world the interests of the privileged in security and sustainability come to depend on their capacity to help others to enjoy the fruits of globalisation.²⁷ Enlightened self-interest therefore leads to a widespread questioning precisely of the *realism* of the ‘dominate them before they dominate you’ school of international relations.²⁸ Second, ‘global consciousness’ is that which emerges to underpin more co-operative relations, for it is that which opens onto a deeper, post-egological conception of reality itself.²⁹

At an existential level this expanded appreciation of reality is frequently experienced as grounded in love. This is for multiple reasons. Love, or compassion to use a vocabulary more common to Buddhism, is the emotion most adequate to the experience of universal empathetic identification. Love puts an equals sign between I and the world, and is therefore basic to solving the problems of the human bond. Love understood properly *is* freedom and freedom as love resolves the anomie in negative freedom and takes the

suffocation out of tradition.³⁰ In fact, beyond differences in institutions and rituals, and beyond contradictions in moral and behavioural norms, love is identified by many of these thinkers as the emotional essence of the wisdom traditions of most cultures.³¹ At the same time love is viewed by many as the essence of the human being, and therefore appears as an existential project—the goal of mutual recognition, the final source of personal satisfaction.³² Consequently it becomes plausible for some of these spiritual internationalists to comprehend love as an ontological truth—the ultimate logos of the world. To have it enter fully into your life is to touch the highest reality there is.

A version of Panentheism

The particular spiritual internationalists we have been considering rarely speak of ‘God’. Nonetheless, the partly unconscious dynamic behind their ideas, and behind those of cognate forms of spiritual politics, is arguably summed up in the idea of the emergence of a progressive global God-image. This can be seen if we consider why this image might be gaining traction, and, just as importantly, why it possesses the qualities I earlier claimed for it. The most economical way to approach these topics is to consider the *panentheistic* dimension of this God-image.

Panentheism, from the Greek *pan-en-theos*, all-in-God, views God as *immanent* in all of existence, yet as also *transcending* all that exists. Just what is involved in both dimensions is the source of much debate, but the idea that the divine might be thinkable as both *in* the things of this world, and as leading *beyond* them, goes back at least to the later writings of Plato.³³ No doubt the promise of that idea—of a divine which is both the mundane Many and the transcendent One—has also been crucial to this God-image’s post-Enlightenment codification and to its more recent growth. In the words of the American philosopher and theologian Philip Clayton, panentheism became ‘perhaps the most significant movement in twentieth century theology’.³⁴ In this respect it is important to note that panentheism is not only a meta-level God-image having historical roots within, and adaptable to, many distinct religious and cultural traditions. It is also ‘meta-level’ in the sense that it is dialectically related to the rise of fundamentalist and otherwise authoritarian God-images. Many people recognise the growing power of these authoritarian conceptions of God as but another side of our increasingly dire predicament. However, it can be shown that there are logical and ethical problems with seeking the simple negation of these authoritarian conceptions. A perspective on the sacred which, in principle, grasps *all other God-images as intrinsic moments of itself*, thus emerges as a goal towards which salvational thought logically tends. And it does so, even though, as an embracing One, it is dispersed through many local, national and civilisational forms.

It seems plausible, meanwhile, that generally panentheistic conceptions are being secreted by several developmental aspects—including ‘secular’ aspects—of the global social process itself. Here we might count the increase of civic forms of consciousness associated with historically unprecedented

agglomerations of urban masses, often centred on cosmopolitan megacities; the transnational network sociality and activism characteristic of the interpenetrating worlds of the web and the planetary mediascapes; and the global culture of techno-science itself. To take up only the latter: the explanatory reach of the modern natural sciences probably fosters a panentheistic God-image for a number of reasons. Its tremendous reach has made many traditional images of the divine, from innumerable anthropomorphisms to the ever-retreating ‘God of the gaps’, simply too incredible for the sober belief of many. At the same time, the equally tremendous ecological and cultural destruction, which science both facilitates and reveals to our understanding, demonstrates its own limitations. The press of these limits implicitly calls for a protective capacity to regard nature itself, even *qua* object of investigation, as sacred.

At this point, no doubt, we also encounter the strong appeal of pantheism. Although more well known than panentheism, there are reasons why this God-image will not do what the cultural moment is asking of it. Literally meaning ‘all (is) God’, pantheism equates God with the universe. In doing so, and in arising anew as a response to the ecological threat, it frequently regards humans solely from the perspective of their belonging to nature. To the extent that it assumes this form, pantheism easily succumbs to hostility towards all that *distinguishes* humans from nature—be this their cultural institutions, their infamous histories, or their highly developed imaginative and reasoning capacities. As such this God-image turns from an account of the Whole as divine into a one-sided divinisation of ecology at the expense of the social, and thus fails as an account of God as the Whole. Meanwhile, the Promethean conquests of humanity, inclusive of its wondrous scientific accomplishments, call out to be comprehended on an equal footing with sacralised nature. Not only nature as object of investigation or contemplation, in other words, but the investigators or contemplators themselves, and their works, insist on their share of the sacred.

This insistence is not arbitrary. It is simultaneously a function and an expression of, the drive for explanatory and experiential integration. Human strivings for knowledge, equality, love, creativity and freedom appear under this light as progressively arising *culminations* of the divine–natural process. Consequently the panentheistic God-image grants itself the right to confirm our sense that these human qualities, while *inseparable* from their opposites, are yet *higher* than, more *sacred* than, are the *progressive transcendence* of, ignorance, domination, hatred, destruction and bondage. And by a strictly parallel logic, the progressive global God-image knows itself to have enemies; but it cannot conceive them *only* as enemies, nor as wholly beyond its own boundaries.

There are no doubt a number of distinct ways of making sense of these assertions. Here we can say, if all too briefly, that the essential impetus is to discern the Self, beyond all splits and obscurities, in and as free reality. Why free reality, and what has this to do with anything answering to the Self? Because, at least under one construal, that which more closely approaches

freedom in the sense of being autonomous, in the sense of being *self*-determined, *transcends* heteronomy and is therefore *more itself*, is more *what it is*. For this reason, that which is free has *more reality* than that which, being *other*-determined, has its being, its cause, its effective will, or its essence outside itself.

As Robert Wallace explores at length in his breakthrough book on *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*, it was undoubtedly Hegel who brought this classical Platonic and Christian Neoplatonic conception of true and free being to its modern zenith in the philosophy of Absolute Spirit.³⁵ Taking off from here, and with all due respect for the many difficulties involved in translating between psychological and philosophical domains, we can say that there are indeed connections to be drawn between that which is revealed to philosophical reflection and the archetypal or 'primary' level of the unconscious.³⁶ Working with these assumptions we can say that, once the Self of any given individual has been seized by a pantheistic God-image (or, to state the matter 'from above', once we view the Self pantheistically), it escapes the Kantian epistemological frame which Jung usually reserved for it.³⁷ Rather than petering out at the boundary of unknowable reality as it is 'in-itself', the Self as *the* integrative structure, simply *is* the dynamic unifying One, that which contains all natural, social and psychological determinations within itself.³⁸ Human consciousness, in seeking to objectify and so transcend its unconscious ground, now comprehends itself as the critical self-transcendence and ongoing completion of the ground itself.

To make these ideas more palpable, we can touch on their implications for the status of social science. Anthropologists and sociologists of religion, for example, will quite properly seek to study different, culturally specific God-images as mere intra-worldly phenomenological objects alongside any others. Yet *this* God-image will keep attempting to reveal their objectifications, and their truth-oriented critical scientific activity regarding all God-images, as faces of its own dynamic process. How so? To the extent that critical social scientific activity succeeds in freeing itself from inherited blind alleys so as to see more and see more accurately, it *transcends* hitherto existing understandings, captures more of the truth, and so more fully realises, more fully brings into actuality, this image of God.³⁹ This does not mean that the progressive global God-image is not itself subject to theoretical and cultural diffraction. It is, will be, and has to be. But its logic, to the extent that I accurately capture it here, is to knit itself together after every unravelling, spying itself in all its other versions.

Spirituality turns left, the left turns to spirit

We seem to be speaking of a God with a truly prodigious dialectical stomach! Indeed, this is necessarily the case. But rather than merely being an indifferent digestive mechanism, we deal here with a conception of the divine that, in becoming more conscious of itself, recognises itself most fully in that which truly progresses beyond and transcends stale repetitions and set-piece

oppositions. This aspect is illustrated if we consider, finally, why the spiritual or religious person and the secular leftist activist might find themselves entering this panentheistic palace, albeit at different entrances.

To simplify matters we must allow ourselves the licence of representing the spiritual person and the leftist as generic trans-cultural types. Considered in this way we can think of them as complementary forms of Hegel's 'unhappy consciousness'. The spiritual people is an unhappy consciousness along the axis 'eternity/history'. As a rule, spiritual people are subjectively assured of our common human belonging to God or the All-Unity or the Ever-Present Origin (or however the eternal-transcendental ground of being is conceived). 'Consciousness raising' for *them* means leading others to an appreciation of our *harmonious belonging* to this numinous realm. However, their personal assurance of common human unity in the transcendent remains just that: a subjective certainty unrecognised by most other humans. Daily, in fact, the believer in the spiritual proposition suffers its socially objective refutation in the violent antagonisms of the empirical world. The secular leftist, meanwhile, is unhappily split along precisely the same axis, but approaches it from the reverse direction, discerning it, however hazily, in terms of 'history/eternity'. Typically they conceive *struggle* as politically primary (think of 'The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle'). 'Consciousness raising' for them means making people aware of the decisive role of exploitative divisions and unspoken exclusions beneath the surface of presumed national and corporate unities. However, unlike certain opponents on the radical right,⁴⁰ they cannot view struggle as the last and exclusive ontological word. They cannot do so, at any rate, without threatening to reveal their own hope for justice, peace and solidarity as vain wishes, empty shouts into the everlasting storm of human strife (hence communism was for Marx the 'the solution of the riddle of history'; that is, it was posited by him and millions of others as both a primitive pre-historical beginning and as the longed-for resolution of the bloodthirsty historical dialectic).

The spiritual person oriented initially to the *vita contemplativa* and to loving regard for the divine in others may therefore be driven, by the pain occasioned by that loving regard, and so by the socially imposed limits on his/her own internal integration, to look also for *social* integration. In this way s/he arrives at the idea of social justice, of historical progress and the necessities of political action. The political person who, on the contrary, was first oriented to the *vita activa* and all its troubles, has by now grown used to defeat, has clipped his/her wings and scaled back his/her dreams, but to no avail. Instinctively s/he knows s/he has been eclipsed historically because as a movement his/her vital supply lines have been cut. Moderation and accommodation, however proximally unavoidable, turn out to have been a form of self-imposed political starvation, for the truly vital supply lines are the ones to the passions which are only ever ignited and sustained when political symbols plunge their roots into the deepest experiences of which humans are capable. Wounded by the history to which they gave their hearts, these activists begin searching for extra-social sources of reassurance that

their actions and hopes are not senseless; a search which leads them where they never thought to go: into contact with the transcendent realms interpreted by religion and spirituality.

Understanding the urgency of a rupture with the historical present, catching sight of the immense systemic forces of exploitation, spiritual people become intent on making political changes; but want to do so without 'getting their hands dirty'. Humanity and the planet, they see, must be defended in an active project, yet they keep noticing that this confronts them with specific enemies who have specific interests and a commitment to those interests. 'What is to be done?!', they ask. They have much to learn from serious engagement with the accumulated political experience and wisdom of the left. Meanwhile, recognising the existence of a spiritual dimension to politics, intuiting that love is a power they always rely on and yet never give credit to, leftists become intent on sounding out these dimensions for themselves; but their historical consciousness baulks at the 'eternal'. Their long-standing orientation to material conditions and material interests, they know, captures something essential, but perhaps something equally essential was lost, they now ponder, when the material took the place of reality. 'What is?!', they ask. They have much to learn from serious engagement with the accumulated experience and wisdom of the spiritually and religiously oriented. But, as we have noted, it is not simply a matter of finding a *lingua franca* for a respectful discussion. If it means anything to say that the *lingua franca* might be informed by the idea of a progressive global God-image, then it must become apparent to both parties that they are mutually dependent; and in far more than a pragmatic sense. This happens when the external cultural split between the one turned to eternity and the one turned to history increasingly shows itself to be an internal split—a split running through the soul of each.

From either side, to be sure, the split is experienced according to contrasting imperatives. There may be, in any given instance, no desirability of practical co-operation. The crisis of neoliberalism may well see a resurgence of class struggles in many countries, and in this context specific spiritual and leftist organisations may find themselves on 'opposite sides of the barricades'. A God-image is not an ideological identification, and nor is an ideological identification the same thing as a concrete political position, or even a willingness to act. Politics involves many sites and stakes of struggle, not to mention a number of levels of (mis)identification. We are concerned here only with an archetypal–ontological level having ethico-political implications; one, thereby, with a capacity to provide general psychological and philosophical orientation. But it is perhaps here, above all, that we are collectively lost. In coming to see the external opposition between the spiritual and the political camps mirrored intra-psychically, each progressive person readies him/herself for the decisive step: recognition that self and other are component elements of the same reality revealed to itself panentheistically. Together the spiritual person and the leftist are nothing less than living representatives of the *eternal* and the *historical* whose implicit unity, in and through their division and their tentative reaching towards each

other, simply *is* the ongoing self-consciousness and practical realisation of this vision of the universe *qua* God.

Or not *qua* 'God' if that word is burdened, in specific contexts, with too much that is unbelievable or unforgivable. The vital point is not the word 'God', pregnant as it is, but rather the specific meaningful and orienting vision of the Whole summarised by the word. On the basis of that vision, spiritual internationalists and internationalist leftists might see the sense in trying to win each other for the work ahead.

Conclusion

Much of political life takes place in national or sub-national terrains, and will go on doing so. Indeed, the relative decline of the global hegemon is creating valuable opportunities for regional and national self-assertion. But at the same time, political life internationally, and to varying degrees nationally, is falling under the archetype of the apocalypse. Today it is not the cold-war stand-off, but rather techno-capitalism's planetary self-totalisation, which generates widespread anxiety about human extinction. Among the many forces galvanised in this situation, perhaps the most important from a progressive standpoint are the 'international left', and those we may call the 'spiritual internationalists'. Arguably these forces should consider each other as long-term allies, if not always as day-to-day friends. But on what basis might they speak to each other? And what will they commonly struggle for, and against? These questions arise against a background of deep pessimism concerning even the hypothetical possibility of a progressive alternative to global capitalism. In turn this socio-political blockage feeds into modernity's metaphysical disorientation. Together these factors both stimulate an urgent need to give substance to the global 'we', and frustrate the capacity to respond to that need. But the spectre of The End can also function as a psycho-cultural threshold, a gateway to a new universal. This politico-ontological universal, which it seems reasonable to assume is incubating in the collective unconscious of many people around the planet, is perhaps thinkable as a progressive global God-image.

The many empirical, methodological, cultural-historical, philosophical and political objections readily provoked by the idea of a new God-image, progressive and potentially global in scope, have been deferred in the foregoing. The point, rather, has been to sketch the most overt and conscious logic of this image, so that its possible existence might become an object of thought. Conceivable as a form of pantheism, the magnetic power of this God-image hinges on the way it identifies the divine with both the Many and the One, with both the immanent and the transcendent, with the secular and the religious, with sceptical reason and ecstatic awe, with history and with eternity. In bringing these 'irreconcilables' within the frame of one unconscious image, many of the oppositions proper to modern life and culture are resituated. Progress too is redefined, for, viewed in this way, progress is not simply transcendence of ignorance and oppression: human

self-transcendence, in and through critical thinking and political struggle, actually is our becoming more fully and freely what we really are.

Today the greening of spiritual concerns is joining with the social justice focus of many religious traditions to push significant numbers of spiritually and religiously oriented people into territory more traditionally associated with the left. This I have explored in connection with the political internationalism, the metaphysical vision, and the emotional–existential focus on love of an illustrative group of spiritual internationalists. The world of power, of exploitation, the frustrations and joys of struggle, the categories of the socio-political and the historical, all begin to press on such people. At the same time the international left finds itself increasingly reconsidering the meaning of its inherited secularism and atheism. Class, gender, neo-imperialism and other categories of the analysis of power remain central to the progressive political project. But the significance of the struggle for equality and justice starts, for some at least, to appear within a wider, numinous, horizon.

What is that wider horizon? If a progressive global God-image really is beginning to emerge, it will eventually be something far more than a framework for the critical and sympathetic encounters of spiritual and political progressives. It will be that by reference to which they can better grasp the antagonisms of the world political process, together with their essential calling within that process.

Notes

- 1 T Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans EB Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973, pp 21, 300.
- 2 W Bello, 'The decline of American power: implications for the Asia-Pacific', First EL 'Ted' Wheelwright Memorial Lecture, University of Sydney, 1 September 2008. See also Bello, 'The capitalist conjuncture: over-accumulation, financial crises, and the retreat from globalisation', *Third World Quarterly*, 27 (8), 2006, pp 1345–1367.
- 3 D Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- 4 The classic study on this archetype, which restricts itself to the last book of the New Testament and to doomsday cults inspired by that book, however, is EF Edinger, *Archetype of the Apocalypse: A Jungian Study of the Book of Revelation*, Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999.
- 5 F Jameson, *The Seeds of Time*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p xii.
- 6 E Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, trans G Niemeyer, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978.
- 7 M Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*, Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982.
- 8 From my notes on the Network of Spiritual Progressives Founding Conference, University of California, Berkeley, 23 July 2005.
- 9 S Clairborne, *The Irresistible Revolution: Living as an Ordinary Radical*, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006; C Davis, J Milbak & S Zizek (eds), *Theology and the Political: The New Debate*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005; R Bhaskar, *From Science to Emancipation: Alienation and the Actuality of Enlightenment*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002; RS Gottlieb, *Joining Hands: Politics and Religion Together for Social Change*, Cambridge, MA: Westview Perseus Press, 2002; S Bulgakov, *Philosophy of Economy: The World as Household*, trans C Evtukhov, Yale, CT: Yale University Press, 2000; A Kotler (ed), *Engaged Buddhist Reader*, Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1996; H Wells, *A Future for Socialism? Political Theology and the 'Triumph of Capitalism'*, Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996; G Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation*, trans C Inda and J Eagleson, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988; JH Cone & GS Wiltmore (eds), *Black Theology: A Documentary History*, Vol II 1980–1992, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993; MP Aquino, *Our Cry for Life: Feminist Theology from Latin America*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993; and A Shariati, *Religion vs Religion*, trans L Bakhtiar, Albuquerque, NM: ABJAC, 1988.

- 10 For an analysis of a national political scene (the USA) from the perspective of competing images of God, see M Lerner, *The Left Hand of God: Taking Back Our Country from the Religious Right*, San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 2006.
- 11 Web and library searches show that the concept 'global God-image', whether 'progressive' or not, does not yet have any currency, at least in English. Only one article was found with the phrase 'global God image', and here the phrase, which occurs only once, has instead the merely negative sense of images of God which lack specificity. See P Granqvist, CL Jungdahl & JR Dickie, 'God is nowhere, God is now here: attachment activation, security of attachment, and God's perceived closeness among 5–7-year-old children from religious and non-religious homes', *Attachment & Human Development*, 7 (4), 2005, p 58. The situation with the term 'spiritual internationalists' is only marginally better, with only two uses of the term found, and both of these referring to contexts no later than the mid-20th century.
- 12 CG Jung, *Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self*, trans RFC Hull, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1959; EF Edinger, *The New God-Image: a Study of Jung's Key Letters Concerning the Evolution of the Western God-Image*, Wilmette, IL: Chiron Publications, 1996.
- 13 E Brient, *The Immanence of the Infinite: Hans Blumenberg and the Threshold to Modernity*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002; L Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993; A Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986; A Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957.
- 14 DV Porpora, *Landscapes of the Soul: The Loss of Moral Meaning in American Life*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p 58.
- 15 For discussion, see D Martin, *Reflections on Sociology and Theology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; and RA Segal, *Religion and the Social Sciences: Essays on the Confrontation*, Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1989.
- 16 R Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- 17 P Norris & Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; D Westerlund (ed), *Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics*, London: Hurst & Company, 1996; and JK Hadden & A Shupe (eds), *Prophetic Religion and Politics: Religion and the Political Order*, New York: Paragon House, 1986.
- 18 PL Berger (ed), *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Michigan: William B Eerdmans, 1999.
- 19 Some key integral and associated thinkers of the 20th century are Aurobindo Ghose (1872–1950), Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), Jean Gebser (1905–73), Frithjof Schuon (1907–98) and Haridas Chaudhuri (1913–75). These journals draw particularly on the thought of contemporaries Ervin Laszlo and Ashok Gangadean, and are influenced by the ideas of Ken Wilber and Don Beck's version of 'Spiral Dynamics', a model of psychosocial and moral development primarily directed at corporate executives. See E Laszlo, *Science and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos: The Rise of the Integral Vision of Reality*, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2006; AK Gangadean, *Between Worlds: The Emergence of Global Reason*, New York: Peter Lang, 1998; K Wilber, *The Eye of Spirit: An Integral Vision for a World Gone Slightly Mad*, Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1997; and DE Beck & C Cowan, *Spiral Dynamics: Mastering Values, Leadership, and Change*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996.
- 20 R Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- 21 L Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice*, San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1981.
- 22 See, for example, P Clayton & J Schaal (eds), *Practicing Science, Living Faith: Interviews with Twelve Leading Scientists*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- 23 World Wisdom Council, 'The Tokyo Declaration', *Kosmos*, V (2), 2006, p 60.
- 24 M Saionji, 'Raising our consciousness to create a new civilization', *Kosmos*, V (2), 2006, pp 42–43.
- 25 M Gorbachev, 'Towards a new civilization', *Kosmos*, V (2), 2006, pp 16–18.
- 26 R Brutoco, 'The global players: governments, civil society and business', *Kosmos*, III (2), 2004, p 10; and N Perlas, 'Societal revolutions in the 21st century: spirit or empire', *Kosmos*, III (2), 2004, pp 38–39.
- 27 AA Said, 'Moving towards a transnational consciousness', *Spirituality & Reality*, II (1), 2002, pp 6–7.
- 28 N Roof, 'Spirituality & reality: thoughts on post 9/11', *Spirituality & Reality*, II (1), 2002, pp 12–13.
- 29 A Gangadean, 'Awakening global consciousness: why it is vital for cultural sustainability', *Kosmos*, III (2), 2004, p 25.
- 30 G Hayashi, 'Perspectives from the readers of Kosmos', *Kosmos*, V (2), 2006, p 44.
- 31 C Wigglesworth, 'Spiritual intelligence: why is it important?', *Kosmos*, V (2), 2006, pp 30–31, 44.
- 32 N Seifer & M Vieweg, 'Perspectives from the readers of Kosmos', *Kosmos*, III (2), 2004, p 44.

- 33 For critical discussion, see JW Cooper, *Pantheism: The Other God of the Philosophers—From Plato to the Present*, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006.
- 34 See generally P Clayton & A Peacocke (eds), *In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Pantheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World*, Michigan: William. B Eerdmans, 2004.
- 35 RM Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- 36 SM Kelly, *Individuation and the Absolute: Hegel, Jung and the Path Towards Wholeness*, New York: Paulist Press, 1993; IM Blanco, *The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-Logic*, London: Duckworth, 1975.
- 37 The Kantian dimension of Jung is pressed home by Edward Edinger in *The New God-Image*. For a Heideggerian reading, see R Brooke, *Jung and Phenomenology*, London: Routledge, 1991. For an attempt to bring Jung into conversation with Hegel, see Kelly, *Individuation and the Absolute*.
- 38 Some contemporary Freudians, following in the tracks of Wilfred Bion, and to a lesser extent of Jacques Lacan, Donald Winnicott and Ignacio Matte-Blanco, are beginning to take another look at the problematic of Ultimate Truth and Absolute Reality. See JS Grotstein, 'The numinous and immanent nature of the psychoanalytic Subject', *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 1998, 43, pp 41–68; and M Eigen, *The Psychoanalytic Mystic*, Binghamton, NY: Esf Publishers, 1998.
- 39 Here I draw on RM Wallace, 'To the heart of our Western tradition: rediscovering the God of freedom', unpublished ms. My thanks to Bob Wallace for making this text available to me.
- 40 C Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans G Schwab, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.

Notes on Contributor

Sebastian Job teaches in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Sydney. He is finalising a book manuscript entitled *Clone Unconscious: The Racist Nationalist Struggle for Russia's Soul*. Parallel to this he is working in the new field of research on the post-cold war emergence of progressive global spirituality, focusing particularly on its relationship to other progressive traditions. His recent publications include articles in the multi-volume *Encyclopedia of Anthropology* (2006) and in *Forum for Anthropology and Culture|Antropologicheskii Forum* (2008).

Copyright of *Third World Quarterly* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.