

# Introduction: nationalisms and their understandings in historical perspective

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*ABSTRACT* This introduction provides the historical and intellectual historical context for our thesis of the transition from developmental to cultural nationalisms. After settling issues of definition and periodisation in relation to nations, nationalisms and the international order, I outline how, in all the main phases in the three-century long birth of the international world out of one of empires, capitalist and precapitalist, in tandem with the spread of capitalism (and initially, imperialism), nations and nationalisms were understood and, often revealingly, misunderstood. Three main distorting factors accounted for the misunderstandings: 1) the implication of nations and nationalisms in the spread of capitalism was ignored; 2) their role, in comparison with imperialism, the other major geopolitical dynamic of the past few centuries, was underestimated; and 3) capitalism was understood, one-sidedly, as a universalising force, a prejudice reinforced by imperialism (especially when it was largely the imperialism of one country, England, in the 19th century). The universal Enlightenment intellectual temper also played a role and it is not surprising, in retrospect, that scholarship on nationalism burgeoned precisely at the time, in the last third of the 20th century, when attention to difference and particularity and the questioning of universal thinking became the leading intellectual trend. This scholarship, however, only accentuated the dominant tendency to understand nations culturally, in separation from political economy and it proved unable to stall the force of the mistaken 'globalisation' thesis about the decline of nations and nationalisms. Throughout this discussion critical insights which more-or-less escaped these distortions and detected the intertwining of culture and political economy in nationalism are noted.

Forging a national essence is the business of nationalists. That of nationalism's historians and theorists is to identify the historical and social parameters within which such forging (and usually considerable amounts of forgery<sup>1</sup>) became at once possible and necessary. How did nations—new types of political communities founding a qualitatively new world order, an

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‘international’ order—come to be?<sup>2</sup> And how did they, and the international order, develop together, each shaping and being shaped by the other?

If we were still grappling with these questions at the close of the 20th century whose last decade saw the generalisation of the nation-state system with the fall of communism, the congenital artifice of nations—always presenting themselves as older, more deeply rooted in the affections of their members, and more homogenous than they really were—was only part of the problem. If the corpus of the historiography and theory of nations and nationalisms which was the result of attempts to answer questions thrown up by their emergence and development was distinctly non-cumulative, full of reversals and dead-ends, this was thanks to a still deeper, structural, problem: the political (and geopolitical) processes which created nations, nationalism and the international order was inextricable from the contemporaneous development of capitalism and civil society—the one particularising, the other universalising, the one mobilising vertically, the other horizontally, the one creating nations, the other, classes. How well one set of phenomena was understood depended not only on how well the other was, but also on whether their relative importance and mutual relationship was correctly judged. This happened rarely. Instead a division of scholarly labour—between a study of nations and nationalisms largely focused on culture and a political economy of national (and international) capitalist development—emerged. This proved fatal to understanding nations. For the entanglement of capitalism and the nation-state, of class and nation, of the universalism of the law of value and the particularity of the various ways in which its inexorable operation has been dammed and channelled by national political economies remains central to understanding both.<sup>3</sup> It is, *prima facie*, surprising, if not astounding, that the literature on nationalism has focused so exclusively on culture, leaving out of account the vast literature on national economic development and the evolution of capitalism on a world scale,<sup>4</sup> even though a (arguably the) central aspect of nationhood has always been one or another sort of economic development domestically and its deployment and management in international activity abroad.

This volume is an attempt to discover the analytical possibilities that lie in cancelling this division of labour. Minimally it shows, from a variety of disciplinary and political perspectives, how little sense it makes. Sumit Sarkar notes how the earliest text of Indian nationalism was a critique of colonial political economy and not some emotionally charged polemic about the national soul or culture: ‘Deliberately keeping his presentation logical rather than emotional, Naoroji made little or no appeal to any sense of cultural distinctiveness or lost glory. From [his] focus on Indian poverty emerged patterns of thinking, and eventually action, seeking remedies in varied, recognisably “developmental” directions’.<sup>5</sup> Other papers also note how poverty, inequality and backwardness were major motives of nationalisms, and not only in the colonies. Indeed, many strands in nationalist thought have revealed an appreciation of the intimate relationship between political economy and culture, as Hein emphasises in her discussion of the debates between the *Kōza* and *Rōnō* economists about the nature of Japanese

modernity in the inter-war period, or as Winichakul does in his contribution about Marxist debates on the Thai social formation in the 1970s. Indeed, the Japanese case is remarkable in that 'most Japanese regarded economic performance as definitive of national identity to an unusual degree, treating the economy as a cultural marker and assuming that culture functioned as an economic engine. In fact, ideas about the economy (as well as economic thought itself) operated as imaginative bridges that connected the Japanese and their nation to the rest of the modern world even as it constructed Japanese uniqueness.'<sup>6</sup>

Keeping both the cultural politics and political economy of nationalism in view, and exploring the relationship and tension between them, the contributions in this volume approach a recent, particularly interesting and widely misunderstood, phase in the history of nations and nationalisms. In attempting to understand their real fate under neoliberalism and 'globalisation' in the last third of the 20th century, we depart from the widely propounded view of the decline of nations, nation-states and nationalisms. We find, rather, a transition from one historically distinct type of nationalism, combining its own cultural politics and political economy, to another: from the 'developmental nationalisms' which dominated in the third quarter of the 20th century to the 'cultural nationalisms' by the century's close, although there are also important and thought-provoking variations. (This would suggest that it may be possible to discern other historically distinct types of nationalism corresponding to distinct phases in the development of capitalism nationally and internationally, going farther back in the history of nationalism. We do not go into the matter here, however.) We focus on selected countries of Asia, which we know something about, but arguably our diagnosis should be more generally valid: certainly we are not proposing a category of Asian nationalisms, although I note the specificity of the nationalisms of Asia in concluding this introduction.

As the world entered the second half of the 20th century, nation-states could be divided according to whether they attempted to restrain (under social democratic regimes), eliminate (under communist ones) or harness (under developmentalist ones) the power of capital in the interest of wider groups. Japan's 'miracle' years, Nehru's, Nasser's and Soekarno's developmentalism, as well as Mao's communism, stood in sharp contrast to the market-driven, capital-friendly regimes that replaced them two or more decades later and to the colonial and fascist ones which had preceded them. Developmental regimes featured distinct developmental nationalisms. In Asia, excepting Japan and Thailand (whose specificities are explored by Hein and Winichakul, respectively), they emerged in anti-imperialist struggles. Popular mobilisations (or minimally, as in Sri Lanka, the requirements of popular legitimacy) required these nationalisms to attempt to construct political economies of development by promoting productivity and relative equality, although accomplishment varied among the resulting capitalist developmental or communist states. While the cultural politics of these nationalisms certainly featured some more or less uncritical celebration of the 'national culture', developmental nationalisms typically adopted a critical

stance towards important aspects of the inherited culture, as for example, the critical view of caste in Indian nationalism, as Sarkar discusses in this volume, or the criticism of the imperial and Confucian heritage in China which Wu highlights. In the developmental vision, national cultures were to *evolve* in more scientific, rational and progressive, even internationalist, directions. In short, developmental nationalisms looked forward to brighter national futures as modern egalitarian cultures and polities and as economies of generalised prosperity in a comity of nations: they typically promised a better tomorrow.

Rather than declining in the last quarter of the 20th century, nationalisms seemed to acquire greater force, and not just in reaction to ‘globalisation’. And their nature changed. The cultural nationalisms that displaced the earlier developmental nationalisms had different names in different nations—‘Asian values’, ‘*Hindutva*’, ‘Confucianism’ and ‘*Nihonjinron*’, for example. The cultural politics and political economy they now embodied also underwent changes and the emphasis shifted from the latter to the former. The political economy of cultural nationalisms was typically neoliberal—flagrantly unequal and not primarily concerned with increasing production or productivity so much as with the enrichment of the (expanded but still tiny) dominant middle, propertied and capitalist classes. The new nationalisms’ cultural politics—whether conceived in religious, ethnic or cultural terms—conceived culture as static, pre-given, and original although, amid the intensified commercialism and commodification of neoliberal capitalism, it was less so than ever before, and attributed to it almost magical powers of legitimation and pacification over potentially restive forsaken majorities. Thinking of cultural nationalisms as majoritarian and homogenising is easy, but also mistaken: for in the neoliberal context, cultural difference—different levels of competence in and belonging to the national culture—served to justify the economic inequalities produced by neoliberal, market-driven policies. Cultural nationalisms often took apparently multicultural and ‘tolerant’ forms as markets performed the work of privileging and marginalization more stealthily and more effectively. In contrast to the popular mobilisations on which developmental nationalisms rested, cultural nationalisms thrived on the relative political disengagement and disenfranchisement which neoliberal inequalities produced. The extremist wings that cultural nationalisms had in many countries were a function of this lack of popular support. In harking back to more or less distant ‘glorious pasts’, it seemed as though what cultural nationalisms offered was not a better tomorrow, but a ‘better yesterday’.

Three of the cases examined in this volume appear to be undergoing crises dire enough to call their continued existence into question: Iraq, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. However, in no case do the causes fit the ‘globalisation’ thesis of decline as a result of the powers of the global market and capitalism. Indeed, as we see it, the transition from developmental to cultural nationalisms is implicated in the shift from developmentalism to neoliberalism. We prefer the term ‘neoliberalism’, because, despite considerable debate over its exact meaning, it is more precise, and of greater historical and geographical scope, than the more popular alternative, ‘globalisation’.<sup>7</sup> While we mean by

neoliberalism the preference for and justification of market-driven policies over state-driven ones across the whole range of policy fields practically the world over in a general sense, we do not define it doctrinally but historically. A world-wide shift in the balance of power in favour of capital underlies this shift in economic policy. It has moved politics radically to the right and recast society in market-driven ways in the last quarter of the 20th century.

In proposing the *historical* categories of developmental nationalism and cultural nationalism, this volume marks another important departure in the literature on nations and nationalisms. Nationalisms tend to be classified, if at all, in trans-historical 'ideal-typical' distinctions, made by Hroch for example, between early and formative phases of nationalisms and later phases.<sup>8</sup> There were also the Eurocentric ideal-types of civic v ethnic or political v cultural nationalisms which trace their roots to the dichotomy between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* at the root of sociological theory, in particular, modernisation theory. Of course, they also separate worthy Western nationalisms from unworthy non-Western ones.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the categories of developmental and cultural nationalism are historical. They mark particular phases in the evolution of nations and of the international order and embody historically specific forms of political economy and cultural politics. Our attention to changes in the nature of particular non-Western nationalisms also overturns monolithic conceptions about them, as Sarkar discusses in his paper. Though elements of developmental and cultural nationalism seem trans-historical, Sarkar also shows how elements long in formation acquired settled forms only at determinate historical moments.

Finally, we reinsert politics into nationalisms because scholars as well as 'politicians, political observers, and not a few "ordinary people"', often seek to bracket off the dirty world of politics from the transcendent community of the nation.<sup>10</sup> Nationalisms are political ideologies, but of a special sort: they define and determine the nature and limits of the modern communities that are nation-states. As such they exist in a constitutive tension with other forms of politics, as Spencer intricately explores in the case of Sri Lanka. Political changes such as the shift from developmentalism to neoliberalism redefine communities, in our case through increased inequality and radical reorientations of state policy in more market- and capital-friendly directions. Redefined communities will acquire, through one means or another, new self-understandings, to wit, new types of national ideologies and cultures whether, as Ann Anagnost shows in the case of China, at the level of popular conceptions of national culture or, as Laura Hein shows in the case of Japan, in the rarefied intellectual discourses of national historical distinctiveness.

In this introduction I settle certain issues of definition and periodisation of nations, nationalisms and the international order in a way that makes it clear how nations and nationalisms embody political economies as well as cultural politics. I go on to show how, in all the main phases in the three-century long birth of an international world out of one of empires, capitalist and pre-capitalist, in tandem with the spread of capitalism (and initially, imperialism), nations and nationalisms were understood and, often

revealingly, misunderstood. Three distorting factors accounted for the misunderstandings: 1) the implication of nations and nationalisms in the spread of capitalism was ignored; 2) their role, in comparison with imperialism, the other major geopolitical dynamic of the past few centuries, was underestimated; and 3) capitalism was understood, one-sidedly, as a universalising force, a prejudice reinforced in equal part by imperialism (especially when it was largely the expansion of one country, England, in the 19th century). The dominance of the universal Enlightenment intellectual temper also played a role. Indeed, it is not surprising, in retrospect, that scholarship on nationalism burgeoned precisely at the time, in the last third of the 20th century, when attention to difference and particularity and the questioning of universal thinking became the leading intellectual trend. This scholarship, however, only accentuated the dominant tendency to understand nations culturally, in separation from political economy and it proved unable to withstand the force of the mistaken 'globalisation' thesis about the decline of nations and nationalisms. Throughout this discussion critical insights which more-or-less escaped these distortions and detected the intertwining of culture and political economy in nationalism are noted. Our thesis of the transition from developmental to cultural nationalism can be seen as an attempt to advance this sort of understanding. I cite particularly valuable points raised in the contributions that follow that are relevant to the general discussion of the introduction.

In the final section I make the case, in general terms, for why the transition from developmental to cultural nationalism provides a more accurate account of the fate of nations and nationalisms than the popular 'globalisation as decline of nation-states and nationalisms'. This discussion forms the opening to the contributions that follow. I have tried to arrange them so that they may best be read consecutively, first building our case with the contributions which explore the ideas more fully, going on to those that constitute interesting variations on the themes proposed and ending with the three cases in which the transition to cultural nationalism appears to have coincided with the possible disintegration of the nation-state but not for the reasons proposed by the 'globalisation' thesis. Of course, readers may also create their own order of reading, depending on their regional and thematic interests. A discussion of the transition from developmental to cultural nationalism as it emerges from the contributions to this volume, highlighting important variations on the general theme which they register, is taken up in the conclusion.

### **When was nationalism?**

While nationalists typically place the origins of their nations in the distant past—usually the more distant the better—by the late 20th century most historians and theorists had come to regard them as modern phenomena. Scholarly partisans of the opposing theory—that nations were primordial—acknowledged, like Anthony Smith, the force of the modernist thesis and now spoke of nations' pre-histories, as it were.

While acknowledging the modernity of nationalism, the ideology, movement and symbolism, and the recent formation of most nations, I have become interested in the possibility of nations prior to nationalism, at least in a few cases, and its implications. But, in general, my approach has focussed on the way that prior, and often premodern, ethnic ties and *ethnies* have influenced, and in some cases, formed the basis for, subsequent nations and nationalisms.<sup>11</sup>

However, agreement on the modernity of nations still left ambiguities. ‘Modernity’ was multifaceted: secularism, new popularisations of religion (such as Protestantism in Europe), vernacular literacy and literatures, popular legitimacy, civil society, industrialism as well as capitalism were among the historically long-drawn-out processes that constituted the historical ‘moment’ of modernity out of which nations were precipitated into history. Moreover, while the most influential accounts of nationalism—from Karl Deutsch’s to Benedict Anderson’s—presented it as an over-determined amalgam of many such processes, there was a pronounced bias towards treating nationalism as a cultural phenomenon. There was no attempt to account for political economy in nation-state formation. Ernest Gellner was the major exception to this tendency.

In his account, the modernist thesis was anchored in a theoretical connection between industrial society and nationalism based on the sociological theory of modernisation.<sup>12</sup> The Industrial Revolution coincided with the French, in any case widely considered the origin of the nationalist political principle that ‘the political and national unit should be congruent’.<sup>13</sup> This afforded Gellner’s dating even greater acceptance. However, Gellner’s account had no place for the formation of the English nation in the English Revolution. This would push the origin of nationalism back more than a century and detach it theoretically from industrialism. The only other major theory to account for nationalism in terms of political economy and to overcome this difficulty was modernisation theory’s chosen antagonist, Marxism. When Tom Nairn resumed its account of nationalism in the 1970s,<sup>14</sup> he established the theoretical connection to capitalist, rather than industrial, society even as he incorporated many of Gellner’s insights. It was also a political and historical, rather than a sociological, account. As Nairn saw it, the mid-17th century birth of the English nation was closely tied to the advent of capitalism and, not surprisingly, England’s priority gave its capitalism as well as its nationalism certain peculiar characteristics.<sup>15</sup>

Tom Nairn’s account focused on the development *together* of nationalism and capitalism and kept the overall evolution of the new international world order in view. Criticising most accounts of nationalism for being ‘vitiating from the start by a “country-by-country” attitude... that human society consists essentially of several hundred different and discrete “nations”, each of which has (or ought to have) its own postage-stamps and national soul’, he argued that ‘the only framework of reference which is of any real utility here is world history as a whole’. ‘It is the forest which “explains” the trees’. In this materialist and historical view, the origins of nationalism lay

not in the folk, nor in the individual's repressed passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the machinery of world political economy. Not, however, in the process of that economy's development as such—not simply as an inevitable concomitant of industrialization and urbanization . . . [but in] the *uneven development* of history since the eighteenth century. This unevenness is a material fact; one could argue that it is the most grossly material fact about modern history. The conclusion, at once satisfying and near-paradoxical, is that the most notoriously subjective and ideal of historical phenomena is in fact a by-product of the most brutally and hopelessly material side of the history of the last two centuries.<sup>16</sup>

The brute material fact of uneven development was denied in the dominant understanding and the gap between it and the expectation of even development was the space of the nationalist experience and imagination which Marshall Berman lyrically evoked as the 'anguish of backwardness'. Speaking of 19th century Russians, he noted that, until the industrial spurt of the 1890s, they

experienced modernization mainly as something that was *not* happening; or else as something that was happening far away, in realms that Russians, even when they travelled there, experienced more as fantastic anti-worlds than as social actualities; or else where it was happening at home, as something that was happening only in the most jagged, halting, blatantly abortive or weirdly distorted ways. The anguish of backwardness and underdevelopment played a central role in Russian politics and culture, from the 1820s well into the Soviet period. In that hundred years or so, Russia wrestled with all the issues that African, Asian and Latin American peoples and nations would confront at a later date. Thus we can see nineteenth-century Russia as an archetype of the emerging twentieth-century Third World.<sup>17</sup>

For people outside its core lands uneven capitalist development was lack, deprivation, imposition, domination and exploitation. Such people:

learned quickly enough that Progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete, by powers which they could not help apprehending as foreign or alien. In practice as distinct from the theory, the acculturation process turned out to be more like a 'tidal wave' (Ernest Gellner's phrase) of outside interference and control. Humanity's forward march signified in the first instance Anglicization or Frenchification, for as long ahead as the people most conscious of the change could see.<sup>18</sup>

They had to choose between being 'drowned' by uneven development's tidal waves and surviving in their face. Guogang Wu's discussion of the political thought in early 20th century China exemplifies this compulsion:

Mainstream Chinese political thinking during the first decade of the century revolved around the question of how to make China into a nation, to forge a

cohesive political system out of the loosely organized power structure of a bureaucratic monarchy, and to ward off the threat to the country's existence in a new world where the competition for power of expansive nation-states promised to consume those societies unable to emulate their example.<sup>19</sup>

Overturning the opposition of class and nation that lingered around the Marxism of his time, drawing on the original and classical theorists of that tradition who had always had a complex and subtle appreciation of their interaction (as we shall see below), Nairn recreated the historical materialist understanding of nations and nationalisms in which they were as endemic to capitalism as classes and just as much based in its material relations, and developed it further. The cultures of nations were formed through political processes of mobilisation and struggle, as much as through sociological ones, whether connected to industrialisation or literacy. And very often nationalist movements coincided with those for enfranchisement and popular participation, giving nationalisms their popular and progressive character. If the masses were to be invited into history, 'the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood'.<sup>20</sup> These were the processes which forced otherwise cosmopolitan national leaders into stooping to vernacular languages and idioms, whether it was the wilyness of the London-trained barrister, MK Gandhi in British India, or 'Donoughmore Buddhists' of Sri Lanka's transition to independence. Such a historical materialist approach to nations and nationalisms subjected them to 'historical analysis and, perhaps, explanation' against the conventional emphasis on 'the emotional, religious aspects of nationalist loyalties', which placed them beyond explanation and made them appear 'mysterious, even magical, and was compatible with the assumptions of nationalists that the essence of nationality was natural and eternal'.<sup>21</sup>

Connecting nationalism with the fundamental historical process of the development of capitalism also made it possible to judge nationalisms' historical role, whether in 'the political baptism of the lower classes',<sup>22</sup> or in challenging imperialism economically and politically on a basis more objective than a universalist unease with nationalism or nationalist partisanship. It also allowed the two faces of 'Janus-faced' nationalism—progressive and atavistic, forward-looking and backward-looking—to be put in proper historical context. And placing nation and class within a common framework also made it possible to theorise their interaction. The class character of a nationalism, and its efficacy in overturning the material consequences of uneven development—to wit, its efficacy as an anti-imperialist project—could, as we see in the case of cultural and developmental nationalisms below, depend on a variety of concrete historical circumstances, in particular on the extent of the mobilisation of the lower classes, and conversely, the extent of the challenge to collaborating classes.

Although Nairn invoked the perspective of the forest over that of the trees, Marxist accounts of the geopolitics of capitalism tended to focus on imperialism, neglecting its other, nations and nationalisms. That began to be corrected in the theoretical perspective which sees the geopolitical

counterpart of the global spread of capitalism in the generalisation of the system of nation-states, maturing alongside it.<sup>23</sup> In Benno Teschke's view:

*Contra* Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*, the expansion of capitalism was not an *economic* process in which the transnationalising forces of the market or civil society surreptitiously penetrated pre-capitalist states, driven by the logic of cheap commodities that eventually perfected a universal world market. It was a *political* and, *a fortiori*, *geopolitical* process in which pre-capitalist state classes had to design counterstrategies of reproduction to defend their position in an international environment which put them at an economic *and* coercive disadvantage. More often than not, it was heavy artillery that battered down pre-capitalist walls, and the construction and reconstruction of these walls required new state strategies of modernization.<sup>24</sup>

Modern (capitalist) international relations began not, as is conventional, with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which only 'expressed and codified the social and geopolitical relations of absolutist sovereignty',<sup>25</sup> with absolutist France as its most powerful signatory, but with the first *modernising* moment, which came with England's 1688 Glorious Revolution and 'the adoption of a new post-revolutionary and parliamentary foreign policy—the "blue water" policy—[which] was linked to the reorganization of economic and political power in Britain, and . . . broke with pre-capitalist imperatives of geo-political accumulation'. The first industrial capitalist country generated not only economic pressures of competition—not only 'cheap prices of commodities' which 'battered down Chinese Walls' as Marx and Engels had it in the *Manifesto*—but also military and geopolitical ones of imperial expansion. It could only be, and was, answered by the formation of nation-states which sought to modernise as a way of not being drowned by the tidal waves of capitalism and imperialism.

International relations in nineteenth century Europe were largely about the management of the modernizing pressure created by the new British state–society complex, which put its European neighbours at a *coercive and economic comparative disadvantage*. This forced state classes to design counter-strategies that led to a series of 'revolutions from above'—the introduction of capitalism. This long period of transformation lasted from 1688 to the First World War for Europe, and beyond for the rest of the world. International relations during this period were not modern, but *modernizing*.<sup>26</sup>

While pre-capitalist or nascent capitalist state classes (and in the typical ex-colonial case, nationalist classes that became state classes) developing counter-strategies, typically 'revolutions from above', were critical in the three-century long modernisation of the international order, an equally important factor operated at the systemic level rather than that of the individual nation, or nation-to-be: the interaction of powerful nations and empires. Napoleonic incursions into Iberia were critical in loosening Spain's grip on its Latin American colonies; defeat in the First World War put paid to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires; defeat in

the Second World War, to the Japanese, and the Cold War confrontation between capitalism and communism enabled the dismantling of the remaining empires.

This historical and political account of nations, nationalisms and the international order could not be more different from Gellner's sociological one. How different the two are can be appreciated by considering his comparison of the world's ethnographic map before nationalism and after nationalism in the concluding pages of *Nations and Nationalism*. It has the typical flavour of the bedtime stories modernisation theorists told about how originally 'traditional' or undeveloped societies would develop or modernise, complete with imaginative metaphors like Rostow's 'take-off' into development. As dependency theorists pointed out, the world's poor societies did not suffer from an original *lack* of development but had been *underdeveloped* by economic and political forces unleashed by the development of capitalism in its richer ones. Gellner's ethnographic map of the world 'before nationalism.'

resembles a painting by Kokoschka. The riot of diverse points of colour is such that no clear pattern can be discerned in any detail, though the picture as a whole does have one. A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterises all distinct parts of the whole: the minute social groups, which are the atoms of which the picture is composed, have complex and ambiguous and multiple relations to many cultures; some through speech, others through their dominant faith, another still through a variant faith or a set of practices, a fourth through administrative loyalty, and so forth.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, the ethnographic and political map of the modern world resembles a Modigliani: 'There is very little shading, neat flat surfaces are clearly separated from each other, it is generally plain where one begins and another ends, and there is little if any ambiguity or overlap'.<sup>28</sup> Such a fable would imply that nation formation was some sort of gradual organic progression from pre-existing multiplicity, diversity and complexity of an original ethnographic substance to unity, homogeneity and simplicity of nations, and from small to large size, powered by the requirements of 'industrial society'. The real tumultuous political history of 'modernising pressures' and imperialisms—pre-capitalist and capitalist—which had always already remade any 'original' ethnographic map, if it ever existed, and of nationalist struggles to further refashion this already doubtful material worked over by imperialism in the interests of erecting more or less ramshackle dykes against the 'tidal waves' of imperialism and capitalism is erased by Gellner. Martin Bunton's opening account of the ethnographic 'raw material' of the Iraqi nation forms an instructive contrast:

At the neighbourhood level, for example, decades of voluntary migration and emigration, as well as forced displacement, produced mixed communities, particularly in urban areas. Here ethnic origin or religious affiliation came to

hold no greater significance by the end of the century than class or social status (at least, until these divisions coincided). On a broader scale, common political experiences such as the revolt against the British after the First World War, or those surrounding the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–1988, as well as common socio-economic processes and prospects, laid the basis for an Iraqi nation-hood that overrode sectarian or ethnic allegiances.<sup>29</sup>

Ethnographic material was just not available in most cases in any pristine form. Rather it entered nation formation already redefined by ‘modernising pressures’ and imperialism (both in imperialising and imperialised nations) and redefined once again by nationalist struggle.

### **The long birth of an international world**

1688–1848

A century was to pass between the emergence of the modern English capitalist nation-state and the next major step in the history of nations and nationalisms, perhaps because only when the originally agrarian English capitalism acquired an industrial basis could it exert sufficiently strong ‘modernising pressures’. Certainly the next great spurt of nationalisms, which began not with the French Revolution, conventionally considered the origin of nationalism, but with the revolt of Britain’s American colonies a few years earlier, was connected with these developments. However, over the next century or so national revolutions were barely recognised as such. The dominant geopolitical trend was the imperial expansion of industrial Britain, which had begun to focus on the vast swathes of the tropical world as even Britain’s loyal temperate settler colonies behaved increasingly like nation-states. After the defeat of the French in India and North America, Britain would face few obstacles and, with trade following the flag, this expansion generated the impression of a seamless expansion of the world market powered by industrial capitalism captured so well in *The Communist Manifesto*. Indeed, the nationalisms of this time scarcely recognised themselves as such, proclaiming universal values and pursuing imperial ambitions. National cultural particularity was further occluded by universal principles in the French case and by shared culture and language with the mother country in the case the former colonies of Britain and Spain in the Americas.

Awareness of a qualitatively new historical trend towards nations and nationalisms did not come easily to an age captivated by the objective universalism of the spreading market and possessed by the spirit of universal reason. National particularity was an unwelcome intruder. Stories about the onward march of universalist logics, whether of capitalism, markets and civil society or reason, contained no place for it. It appeared, if at all, as a ‘particularity without quiddity’.<sup>30</sup> For the major thinker of his time, Hegel, the national character or ‘*Sittlichkeit*’, was ‘curiously vestigial’.<sup>31</sup> Hegel both recognised national particularity and emptied it of substance.

There is a logic to this paradox. The variety of national states is structurally underdetermined in Hegel's vision of the modern world, because there is only room for one truly rational version at a time. The states of history form a sequence of natural principles realizing the development of the world spirit, each of which is allotted to a single nation, and confers on it 'fulfilment, fortune and fame' in turn. This nation becomes 'the *dominant* one in world history for this epoch, *and only once in history can it have this epochal role*'—but so long as it enjoys this 'absolute right' as the bearer of the world spirit, 'the spirits of other nations are without rights, and like those whose epoch has passed, no longer count in world history'.<sup>32</sup>

In such a *universal* vision only a few nations could be truly historical and Hegel consigned the smaller ethnicities of Central and Eastern Europe to the category of 'history-less peoples', deemed incapable of achieving nationhood. Pragmatically such biases translated into notions of the minimum viable size of nations requisite for successful (capitalist development and) nationhood which were widely accepted. In an imperial age, they also justified empire.<sup>33</sup>

Marx and Engels<sup>34</sup> were no more than creatures of their age when they focused on the development of capitalism, civil society and classes, and the imperialism that was their vehicle, neglecting any systematic treatment of the 'national question'.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, Marx was aware of the geopolitical stakes in the spread of capitalism and the role nations could play in resisting imperialism. In the text generally seen to be an apologia for imperialism, Marx recognised how the Industrial Revolution changed imperial motivations: before the onset of industrial capitalism, 'The ruling classes of Great Britain . . . had . . . but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it'.<sup>36</sup> (Marx 1974: 321). Industrial capitalism required it to produce raw material and to buy finished goods, forcing the colonial power to attend to the colony's productive capacity, with historically complex effects:

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected progress without dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?<sup>37</sup>

Only with an end to colonial and imperial exploitation either in socialism or in nationalism—when 'in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or . . . the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether'—would Indians to 'reap the fruits of the new elements of society [thus] scattered among them'.<sup>38</sup>

One insight of these 19th century thinkers has recently been lost sight of, however. Hegel was off-hand about unique national character. It was a 'particularity without quiddity'. Structurally national ideologies and cultures are remarkably similar and Nairn referred equally off-handedly to their postage stamps and national souls. We might add to this their consciousness of material deficiency and their swagger about spiritual/cultural superiority—the only stance possible for those conscious of the need to stand up to and catch up with the materially superior powers. So when Benedict Anderson proposed his now (in)famous idea of 'modular' nationalism, he was not wrong to refer to the formal similarities of nationalist ideologies. These similarities arose from structurally similar problems posed by the uneven development and the broadly similar means normally available to address them. The problem was that Anderson saw them as a matter of imitation, of intellectual transmission;<sup>39</sup> Partha Chatterjee complained that these models were Western in origin, consigning all non-Western nationalism to 'derivative' status.<sup>40</sup> Both overlooked that if these 'models' were Western, they were only Western first and that there was plenty of room for creativity. Within the parameters of these similarities, nationalists faced the challenges they did, and deployed the resources they had, in a range of ways which were more or less creative and more or less effective in fulfilling the political and economic tasks of building nations. Perhaps no one who was focused solely on culture, as Anderson and Chatterjee were, could be expected to fathom this.<sup>41</sup>

Insufficiently acknowledged though it may have been through most of the 19th century, nationalism was remaking 19th century Europe as much as capitalism was, and in combination with it. The French Revolution arrayed capitalist Britain alongside Europe's most conservative imperial powers as the French manufacturing and commercial interests struggled against the dominance of the British and the revolution threatened to inspire the British proletariat.<sup>42</sup> In the tortuous course of the French republic and through the wars that followed, French revolutionary universalism was transformed into a distinctive form of nationalism (and not just imperialism) which echoes in eerie ways in 21st century debates over headscarves. The revolutionary formation of the French nation involved, of course, the 'political baptism of the lower classes' and, if revolution were not enough, the imposition of the *levée en masse* in the wars that followed ensured that the lower classes would be mobilised in the name of the nation.

In a world substantially carved up by European imperialisms, old and new, European developments had repercussions elsewhere. Napoleonic incursions into the Iberian peninsula provided the cue for rebellions against feudal Spanish colonialism in the Americas, creating a system of nation-states in most of that continent by the mid-19th century. Pre-capitalist empires were to meet their end earlier than capitalist ones as nation-states spread and these events portended the end of the Hapsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires in the Great War. While that war also ended the capitalist empire of defeated Germany, it was not until the end of the Second World War and the historical moment composed of US hegemony (with its interest in the diminution of the power of its capitalist rivals), the power of the USSR with

its support for national liberation, and the Cold War between them, that the gathering strength of national liberation struggles put and end to formal capitalist empires.

### *1848–1914*

Napoleonic expansion, brief though it was, also gave rise to new nationalisms in Europe, but they began as class struggles practically everywhere. The mid-19th century revolutions of this ‘Springtime of the Peoples’ were ‘in fact or immediate anticipation, social revolutions of the labouring poor’.<sup>43</sup> However, although the working classes were making their debut on the European political stage, their politics were not to mature into mass social democratic parties for another three decades. In the mid-19th century working class social radicalism only elicited repression. Radical and popular forces were able to retain revolutionary momentum only where ‘the crucial issue was national liberation’,<sup>44</sup> as in Italy and Hungary, leading in the one case, more than two decades later, to unification and in the other to autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Nationalist sentiments awakened at this time were also the beginnings of the nationalisms of Germany and Rumania. The opposition of (working) class and (bourgeois) nation in these cases remains critical to thinking about nationalism across the political spectrum to this day.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the nationalist character of these events, overall attention remained fixed on the imperial high noon of British expansion with which the period opened and by the ‘New Imperialism’, in which British imperialism and industrial supremacy were challenged, as the period closed. The ‘New Imperialism’ denoted intensified imperialism and inter-imperialist competition—the infamous European ‘Scramble for Africa’, the USA’s forays into Asia as its internal colonialism came to a natural end at the Pacific and Japan’s incursions into China, Korea and Taiwan—which led to the Great War and became the subject of classical theories of imperialism. However, three other critical developments also characterised this period, all of them centring on nations and nationalisms. First, the emergence of the classic ‘late developing’ nation-states—pre-eminently the USA, Germany and Japan—which successfully challenged the industrial (and consequently, the imperial) supremacy of the most successful capitalist and imperial country of their time,<sup>46</sup> was the precondition of the ‘New Imperialism’. Second, in domestic politics a deeper intertwining of class and nation was emerging in Europe, one which was to be responsible for the defeat of the working class internationalism of the Second International on the eve of the Great War. Finally, there were the beginnings of nationalist consciousness in the colonised parts of the world, including most of Asia.

Since the start of the Industrial Revolution England had enjoyed an industrial superiority born of priority. The manufacturers of the first industrial capitalist country in the world ‘never did compete successfully against other *capitalist* manufacturers. What they did was to overwhelm *pre-capitalist* production everywhere’.<sup>47</sup> That easy superiority, and the

geopolitical order based on the imperial 'expansion of England', were both challenged by emerging industrial capitalist powers. In the late 19th century classic processes of 'late-developing' state-making and state-led industrialisation in the face of capitalist and imperialist pressures were completed in four instances, three of which were to emerge as major challengers to Britain's manufacturing supremacy. By 1870 the unification of Germany, the Risorgimento in Italy, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan were complete and the USA had concluded its Civil War with the victory of northern industrial capitalists over the southern slave-owning plantocracy. These state elites now employed and, as necessary, invented nationality to serve their interests in a larger project of domestic modernisation and industrialisation.

If capitalist geopolitics was composed of the opposed logics of imperialism and nation-state formation, the late 19th century was a moment of their equipoise. For nationhood and competitive imperial assertion were two sides of the same coin: Britain's loss of its industrial supremacy began precisely at the end of the 1860s when all three nations which were to challenge Britain completed their nation-formation. These states now industrialised by rejecting the doctrine of free trade espoused (though not practised) by the premier nation of the time. The late developers were also conscious of the important role of the empire in England's industrial supremacy and their competition for colonies was an aspect of their 'catch-up' industrialisation. The world created and dominated by the capitalist and imperialist expansion of the first industrial capitalist country under the guise of free trade<sup>48</sup> had ceased to exist and was replaced, for a time, by one of competing national capitalisms and imperialisms.

Although the nation-state lay just as close to the heart of the events which closed the 19th century, in this period too its role was insufficiently recognised. Intellectual attention, pre-eminently that of Marxists, was fixed on the 'New Imperialism'<sup>49</sup> not least because of its role in causing the Great War. The nationalisms threatening the old-style imperialism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were only the fuse, while the New Imperialism was the powder-keg, of the Great War, 'an imperialist . . . annexationist, predatory . . . war of plunder' as Lenin, but not Lenin alone, was to see it.<sup>50</sup> During and after the war and the Russian Revolution, however, as we see below, Lenin and the Bolsheviks also theorised the interaction of empire, nation and class for the purposes of the nationalities policy of the fledgling USSR and to theorise their support for national liberation struggles in the colonial world.

Accelerated and competitive and state-led industrialisation spawned large working classes and their modern social democratic—Marxist—parties of the Second International. Its internationalism, however, was being undermined by an institutional undertow which channelled working class political energies away from revolution towards their respective nation-states in reformist engagements to an extent that only became shockingly clear on the eve of the First World War. Under working class pressure, or in efforts to pre-empt and co-opt it, the franchise expanded and reform to address the worst forms of capitalist privation took root. These gains geared working class parties' immediate practical concerns and institutional structures so

closely to national political institutions as to practically detach them from the theoretical ideal of working class internationalism.<sup>51</sup> On the eve of the Great War, European working classes chose national over class loyalties, demonstrating that, as Jürgen Habermas put it more recently,

The phenomena of the territorial state, the nation and a popular economy constituted within national borders formed a historical constellation in which the democratic process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form. And the idea that one part of a democratic society is capable of a reflexive intervention into society as whole has, until now, been realised only in the context of nation-states.<sup>52</sup>

Karl Polanyi's term for such reflexive social intervention was the 'double movement'<sup>53</sup>—counteraction of the corrosive effects of the market on society with an answering movement of social protection. Within the institutional frame of the nation-state it would be the basis of the greatest of working class gains hitherto—the welfare state in advanced capitalist countries. However, the capitulation of mass working class parties to the principle of nationality, and the aggressive uses to which nationalism would be put during the two world wars and by fascism, put nations and nationalism athwart universal principles, whether liberal or Marxist, and confounded scholarship on nationalism for many more decades. Perhaps even more significantly the nationalisms of the ex-colonial world after the Second World War, the developmental nationalisms of which we speak in this volume, were chastened by these experiences, and had to accommodate the expectations of mobilised populations. They learned, by contrast, in progressive—egalitarian and internationalist directions.

In the colonial and semi-colonial world, including most of Asia, this period also marked the beginnings of the modern nationalist consciousness that founded the developmental nationalisms of which we speak. These too represented a historically specific combination of class and nation. Colonial incursions into Asia and Africa had originally faced and overcome resistance from pre-capitalist and pre-modern states and elites: in India this type of resistance came to an end in the wars of 1857, while in Africa or China, where colonial incursions came later, for instance, they took place towards the end of the 19th century. With the stabilisation of colonial rule, however, there emerged modern professional and bourgeois classes, creatures and often collaborators, of colonialism who would eventually come to resist it in the form of modern nationalist liberation movements. Key nationalist organisations that would play a critical role in decolonisation and national independence in the colonial world, primarily in Asia and Africa, were formed in this period: included the Indian National Congress in 1884 and Sun Yat Sen's Revive China Society in 1894.

They typically began as elite organisations working to advance the interests of narrow professional and business elites within the rubric of colonial rule. It was not until the sharpening of popular movements, many of which, rather than being anti-colonial or nationalist, were directed at local

elites and oppressions, that these organisations took a mass form. Where these popular energies and left forces were strong, these struggles overtook specifically nationalist organisations, as classically in China, to take a communist form, although that remained strongly inflected by nationalism. Elsewhere nationalisms were led by the professional and nascent capitalist classes, who were increasingly more ambivalent about colonialism and chafing against the restrictions of racism and colonial economic policies to their own advancement. The contemporaneous nationalist and state-led catch-up industrialisation of the 'late developers' was a beacon to many of them and, in Asia in particular, Japan's ascent, and particularly, its victory over 'European' Russia, electrified many elite nationalists. Their task now was to articulate varied, disparate and, indeed, disconnected discontents into unified nationalist movements against colonialism while containing their radicalism as far as possible. The latter required, however, concessions to those energies and radicalisms and, as we shall see in the contributions and in the conclusion, these popular and left energies were critical to the making of developmental nationalisms and imparted to them their progressive character.

1914–45

The Great War not only completed the nation-state system in Europe, as Teschke noted, but became the crucible of a dramatically new diplomacy which was the outcome of the new intersections of nation and class in Europe. Although the internationalism of the European working class succumbed to the nationalist pressures of the Great War, Arno Mayer argued that the new mass character of the war, involving relatively conscious working classes, also produced democratic pressures for the public discussion of war aims on belligerent governments. When, to this, was added the Russian Revolution, the belligerents in the Great War could no longer pursue traditional imperialist and annexationist goals. Revolutionary Russia's publication of secret treaties, Lenin's call for the publication of war aims and, finally, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918,<sup>54</sup> essentially a 'counter-manifesto' to the radical anti-imperialism of the Bolsheviks, changed the war, and diplomacy, forever. The outcome was to be a diplomacy of 'open treaties openly arrived at' in the League of Nations. Although this is even yet to be fully achieved, the *ancien régime* of secret elite diplomacy and geopolitical management could never be restored.

While an international order of nation-states could not be born until three destructive decades and another world war had done their work, Lenin's wartime reflections on national self-determination, in particular his three-fold classification of the nations of the world for the purposes of communists, was prescient in many respects. As he saw it, in the countries of advanced capital, where 'bourgeois progressive national movements came to an end long ago', the communists and the working class must struggle for socialism. In the countries of Eastern Europe, which in the 20th century had developed 'bourgeois-democratic national movements and

intensified the national struggle', it was important to support the right of nations to self-determination. Finally, there were the

semi-colonial countries...and all the colonies...[where] the bourgeois-democratic movements have either hardly begun, or are far from having been completed. Socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies...but must render the most determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and assist their rebellion—and if need be their revolutionary war—AGAINST the imperialist powers that oppress them.<sup>55</sup>

A keen appreciation, practical as well as theoretical given the fledgling USSR's nationalities, of the material basis of nationalism in capitalism's uneven development and of the manner in which it intersected with the equally material phenomenon of class, underlay Lenin's understanding. The modern anti-imperialist nationalisms that were emerging among nascent capitalist and middle classes already in the late 19th century had, Lenin recognised, the potential to be historically progressive.

Given the centrality of national questions, internationally and for the Bolshevik regime internally, this period witnessed a flowering of Marxist theorisation of nationalisms. Following Lenin, Gramsci and Bauer, in particular, attempted political and theoretical reconciliations of class and nation in their writing—on the 'national-popular' and relationship of nationalism and socialism, respectively.<sup>56</sup> Gramsci's explorations have proved the most resonant. They echoed Marx and Engels's dictum in *The Communist Manifesto* that 'The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie' and argued that ruling class domination was nationally organised in the form of hegemonies. National working class struggles against them on the terrain of the 'national-popular' were the first step in any global emancipation from capitalist domination. 'To be sure the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is national and it is from this point of departure that one must begin'.<sup>57</sup> Empty or abstract universalisms which ignored the reality—economic, political and moral-cultural—of the nation<sup>58</sup> resembled the 'cosmopolitanism...of the Catholic Middle Ages, centred on Italy' which was responsible for the 'absence of any Italian "political and national history"' which he so brilliantly analysed and lamented.<sup>59</sup>

In Gramsci's view the national-popular terrain was produced by the popular energies mobilised by bourgeois revolution and the later task of socialists was to radicalise these national-popular energies towards socialism. In Italy this task was difficult precisely because of an only partially successful bourgeois revolution which failed to lay the basis of a truly national culture.<sup>60</sup> National cultures provided the popular medium through which socialist parties and their intellectuals could establish the communicative,

cultural and political bonds with the 'people-nation'.<sup>61</sup> Without this bond, socialism was impossible. Too few socialist intellectuals appreciated this:

The popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand, and in particular does not always feel. The two extremes are therefore pedantry and philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other... The intellectual's error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned... in other words, that the intellectual can be an intellectual... if distinct and separate from the people-nation, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people... without connecting them dialectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated—ie knowledge. One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people-nation. In the absence of such a nexus the relations between the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced to, relationships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order; the intellectuals become a caste, or a priesthood.<sup>62</sup>

Although the principle of national self-determination was placed on the historical agenda at the end of the First World War, it would take another world war to destroy capitalist empires. The First World War could only make good work of the pre-capitalist ones, although Germany as a defeated capitalist power lost its empire too. Between them the Great War and the Russian Revolution sundered three pre-modern empires, though with varying results. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire largely completed the process of nation-state formation in Europe. The Russian Revolution saw the replacement of Tsarist imperialism over the vast empire's non-Russian populations by Leninist nationalities policy which realistically acknowledged the political force of nationalism and aimed to 'reverse Russian privilege and undermine Great Power chauvinism'.<sup>63</sup> Contrary to the general view that Soviet communism dogmatically suppressed nationalities, it would preserve nations where they existed and support the emergence of nascent ones by encouraging local cultures, languages and elites within the context of Soviet development, even though the Russian privilege was soon restored. It was this, rather than any eternal and primordial 'sleeping beauty' national sentiments, which ensured that the end of the USSR seven decades later would take the form of its break-up into constituent nations. Finally, the non-Turkish territories of the Ottoman Empire were subjected to British and French mandates, as were German territories in Africa, a half-way house to national self-determination. As long as capitalist colonialism needed the justification of racism, outright independence in these areas would prove too destabilising. Equally, however, the mandate system was a symptom of the new illegitimacy of colonialism.

With national self-determination on the world agenda after the First World War and nation-states appearing likely even in Asia and Africa, the notion of the 'history-less peoples' became obsolete. However, other distinctions appeared, no longer denying the possibility of nationhood to

‘history-less peoples’ but denigrating it. Particularly against the background of fascism,<sup>64</sup> distinctions were made between liberating and oppressive forms of nationalism, political and cultural forms, and ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ forms, usually to the detriment of the poor parts of the world. A good example is Hans Kohn’s distinction between ‘pristine’ nationalisms—the English, American and the French—which were ‘new... fundamentally liberal and universal’, more liberating and less oppressive, and others which followed. The latter were condemned to focus on racial or ethnic identity with repressive and reactionary consequences.<sup>65</sup>

Such suggestions can hardly be taken seriously today. Tom Nairn showed how all nationalisms were Janus-faced,<sup>66</sup> with forward-looking and backward-looking, and politically progressive and potentially atavistic, aspects. They brought much of the liberation represented by capitalist modernity, as well as its oppression. If they were responsible for violent and genocidal horrors, they also moved legitimacy from its old dynastic/colonial basis on to a new popular one, making citizens out of subjects. They brought the masses into history and envisaged material reorganisations of society which attacked the inequities of the past.

As communities, no matter how modern, nations were founded on more or less accurate narratives of origin and history, and were related to the particular communities that pre-dated them—whether they cut across or were cross-cut by these older communities. Such incongruities created ‘national minorities’ practically everywhere and they against which nations defined themselves, although, as we shall see, developmental nationalisms tended to blunt the edge of these negative dynamics. At any rate the innocent universalism implied by Kohn in the case of his ‘pristine nationalisms’ was always impossible. All the three candidates for priority in Kohn’s account of nationalism, England (1688), the USA (1776) and France (1789) were fundamentally defined against various others at the very moment of their formation: France and England had their colonies and US nationalism was based on a white identity as against both black and Native. If the spirit of the age (or in the case of England, religion) imparted to these nationalisms a universalism, it became the basis of imperialisms in the form of White Man’s Burdens, civilising missions and Manifest Destinies. Tom Nairn also pointed out how these older nationalisms acquired the same ethnic and cultural characteristics as other nationalisms in the course of the mid-19th century through wars and popular struggles, in what Gellner called the ‘age of nationalism’.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, few nationalisms were so modest as not to imagine themselves capable, as Wu says about Chinese nationalism, ‘of offering universal values to mankind’.<sup>68</sup> Eurocentric accounts dichotomising Western and non-Western forms of nationalism did, however, reinforce certain conservative and even reactionary strands and motifs in non-Western nationalisms which re-emerged in cultural nationalisms. The dichotomy was accepted but its values inverted. Kindred oppositions between state and society, modernity and antiquity, diversity and homogeneity, in which the first term referred to the West and the second to the non-West, came to romanticise and essentialise national culture and identity, as Winichakul

shows in the case of nationalists (including, incidentally, Gandhi in India) who romanticised the ‘essential’ non- and anti-western traits of the national culture.

1945–

‘One of the supreme ironies of the twentieth-century experience must be that nationalism’s principal opponent, namely Marxism, has been both empowered by its alliances with nationalism and responsible for creating the conditions for the development of nations in the Second and Third Worlds’.<sup>69</sup> Ironies pay reflection handsomely. As we have seen, nation and class were theoretically estranged progeny of the process of capitalist development. They were intricately intertwined in modern history, and perhaps nowhere more so than in the USSR. Moshe Lewin’s judgement that the USSR, rather than being communist in any meaningful sense, might more accurately be regarded as a powerful form of developmentalism suggests that 20th century communism was as much, if not more, about the logic of the uneven development of world capitalism as it was about the logic of class and capitalist exploitation.<sup>70</sup> And after the Second World War its power was the single most important factor in the global spread of the nation-state system. It may well be the greater part of its historical significance than its flawed attempt to build communism.

The inability of the USA and its allies to defeat fascism without an alliance with communism meant that the USA was able to emerge as the pre-eminent power in the capitalist world after the Second World War only at the cost of shrinking its total size, conceding important parts of the world to communism. At the same time both the USA and the USSR had an interest in sponsoring decolonisation. The USA had its home-grown imperative of breaking up European empires to diminish the power of its capitalist rivals and to free up room for US capital, and the cold war imperative to contain Soviet influence in the ex-colonial world, particularly in a context where it would all-too-easily appeal to popular and left-wing elements in Third World nationalist movements. Discourses of self-determination, decolonisation and development, rejected after 1919, now emanated from Washington. For its part, within cold war and resource limits, the USSR continued its historical support for nationalist and developmental state-making in the Third World and attempted to contain US influence in it. To these superpower imperatives and motivations were added the force of nationalist struggles.

The combined result was the 1945 settlement creating the United Nations and sponsoring the decolonisation which would swell its membership from 51 in 1945 to 99 in 1960, the high point of decolonisation (and 192 today), generalising the system of nation-states across the globe. Of course, the UN’s twin founding conceptions of sovereign equality and non-intervention—the placing of the most powerful nation-states on a legal par with the least powerful and the renunciation of the sovereign right to go to war—were never fully realised.

The UN system did not...realise full sovereign equality. In practice, the Security Council overwhelmingly predominated, with each of its self-appointed permanent members...retaining the rights of veto. Still, sovereign equality was given technical recognition in parity of representation in the General Assembly and lip-service was paid to the principle of non-intervention, setting legal restrictions on the right to wage war.<sup>71</sup>

These were not inconsiderable gains and a new world order of nation-states did come into being.

The 1945 settlement, preserved in the principles of the UN Charter, reflected a new international situation, *transformed by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power and the spread of national liberation struggles in Asia, the Middle East and Africa*. Ideologies of race and empire, too, seemed definitively vanquished...the inter-war consensus on the 'non-applicability of the right to self-determination to colonial peoples' could no longer be sustained...The result was nominal great-power acceptance—however hypocritical—of a law-bound international system.<sup>72</sup>

The new international order signified critical limits on imperial power. This 1945 settlement, the creation of the United Nations (which now made a seat in it another requirement of nationhood, alongside postage stamps and national souls, not to mention airlines) and the decolonisation which went with them, brought into being more nation-states in the world than any phase of nation-formation before and brought the formation of the international order of world capitalism close to completion. From the mid-20th century onwards anti-colonial nationalisms achieved their successes and continued into the 1990s with the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the independence of Namibia. Freed from colonial constraint, inducted into a global order which permitted national development strategies, most newly independent countries entered a new, higher growth path, became capable of sustaining larger populations and many industrialised to a considerable degree, even though the gap in per capita incomes between them and the advanced industrial world continued to widen. How were these new nations and their nationalisms understood and how did they, in turn, affect the understanding of nations and nationalisms?

After the Second World War the study of nationalism naturally focused on nationalist struggle and decolonisation in the Third World. 'Nation-building' was part of its 'modernisation'.<sup>73</sup> Despite the volume of writing on the subject, and the richness and novelty of the material available to it, originality was lacking largely because the Third World was not so much the object of study as it was the occasion to rehearse a certain type of story about the European history of nationalism which the country or countries of the Third World under study were expected to mimic—needless to say, badly. The great theoretical gain of this phase—the idea of the modernity of nations and nationalisms—was actually a theoretical outcome of the adoption of the modernisation paradigm, although undoubtedly it worked well at a time when the principle of nationality was being

extended to more 'peoples without history' than ever before. Eurocentrism, which lay at the core of modernisation theory, persisted—'Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century' began Elie Kedourie's classic study from this period—for the most part working in distinctions between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalisms or real nationalism versus merely anti-colonial struggles.

The end of colonialism and the creation of nation-states in the former colonial world were not, however, the end of the course for nationalism: beginning in the late 1960s new nationalist struggles made their appearance. As separatist and sub-nationalisms, they emerged not just in the Third World, where borders were so often deemed to be illegitimate in the dominant Eurocentric discourse, but also in the homelands of the so-called 'old nations' of Europe—in Britain or the Basque country as much as in Bangladesh. Nationalism also emerged in the communist bloc where it had been accepted, but presumed neutralised (it was never denied outright), in the form of nationally-based critical movements and, in Southeast Asia, wars between communist nations. We may see in the fate of these sub- and separatist nationalisms just how entrenched the not-yet-two-decades-old world-wide system of nation-states had become. For, with the exception of Bangladesh, which uniquely in the history of nationalism was separated from the rest of Pakistan by 1000 miles of potentially hostile territory, none eventuated in the formation of new nation-states. In retrospect the most important development, after decolonisation, came much later, in the break-up of the USSR. This is in important degree testimony to the successful nation-building capacities of developmental nationalisms. Even though Iraq, Sri Lanka and (the former West) Pakistan, as contributions to this volume show, are being tested by severe centrifugal forces today, they constitute exceptions that prove the larger rule about developmental nationalisms explored by this volume.

Nevertheless, this re-emergence of nationalisms was theoretically productive. While not all would agree with Eric Hobsbawm that 'the number of works genuinely illuminating the question of what nations and national movements are and what role in historical development they play is larger in the period 1968–88 than for any earlier period of twice that length',<sup>74</sup> the understanding of nationalism certainly reached a new plateau in this period. A number of major theoretical developments was associated with this phase. The idea of the modernity of nations, already present in modernisation theory, was further underscored in the work of Ernest Gellner, emphasising its structural, sociological, links to the rise of modern industrial society. In *Thought and Change* and later in *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner argued that the need in modern industrial societies for a spatially and occupationally mobile and literate population required, and brought forth, nations and nationalisms. It made the role of vernacular languages in education and the media in laying the foundations of nations and nationalisms very clear. If Gellner produced a sociological account, Tom Nairn produced a related but more overtly political account, and one which took not industrialism but the dynamics of the world-wide development of capitalism as its materials anchor. Another notable intervention on the nexus of nation and class was

Miroslav Hroch's comparative study of European nationalisms which threw light on the particular social classes which were mobilised by nationalism in its main phases.<sup>75</sup> The idea of the modernity of nations was elaborated by works emphasising its 'invented' or 'imagined' character.<sup>76</sup>

Scholarship on nationalism was also affected by the general trend towards attention to the politics of difference and there was a veritable explosion in writing about women and the gendered aspects of nationalisms, exploring the appropriation of women's agency by nationalist movements, according them a largely rhetorical place within nationalist discourse, and the limited emancipation which came to them as nationalist regimes reconstructed patriarchal and sexist social structures and state forms in new ways.<sup>77</sup> It is a trend Moghissi's contribution to this volume emerges from but also elaborates by focusing on the continuing relevance of women's agency in a context riven by class and political complexities. Work on women and nationalism was followed by interest in the national and nationalist construction of masculinities. These works emphasising difference in nationalisms were part of the rise in the 1980s of 'cultural studies' and, given the centrality of nation and culture to each other—given, moreover, that on the whole studies of nationalism have tended to emphasise culture alone—it was inevitable that this would have a huge impact on the literature on nationalism. Indeed, Eley and Suny put their finger on it when they say that, coming on the heels of the insistence on the invented and imagined character of nationalisms, cultural studies enabled scholars of nationalism 'to reinstate the centrality of culture in nation-forming without reattaching it to a misplaced notion of the primordial'.<sup>78</sup> Studies of popular culture, literature, media, discourses of and on the nation, representation of and in the nation, of identity and othering, etc all came from a variety of sources.

These developments were well into their stride when the USSR broke up, leading to the independence of its constituent republics. It has been conventional to see the emergence of these new nation-states as the result of the awakening of long-suppressed primordial nationalities. However, as Suny argued, they were the product of 'the party's unwitting promotion of national consolidation within the bonds of the Soviet imperial arrangement and Leninist nationality policy'.

The processes associated with 'modernization'—industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy and social mobility, the emergence of civil society—had both centrifugal and centripetal effects on the Soviet peoples. Transforming societies within a set of politically constituted 'nations', the Soviet project created new 'national' working classes, intelligentsias, and political elites within republics, while simultaneously encouraging migration into and out of the republics, promoting the use of Russian and rewarding those who best adapted to the new, 'modern' Soviet ways of life.<sup>79</sup>

The fall of communism not only created new nations within the territory of the former Eastern Bloc. It also seemed, for a while, to open up possibilities for their creation in other parts of the world where the Cold War had prevented nationalist

movements from achieving their goals. Palestine and Northern Ireland are two of the chief examples, though the road to nationhood in these cases has been longer and rockier than initially anticipated. Whatever promise these developments held for the understanding of nations and nationalisms, the exceptional productivity of scholarship of the two preceding decades was now abruptly interrupted by widespread anticipation of the decline of nations, nation-states and nationalisms which originated in quite other quarters of scholarship: the idea that 'globalisation' was making nation-states and nationalisms irrelevant.

### **Globalisation? Decline of nations and nationalisms?**

By the 1990s it seemed to many that 'globalisation' was set fair to consign nations and nationalisms to the proverbial 'dustbin of history'. It was making borders and states irrelevant and nations, new and old, were undercut and cross-cut by the politicisation and commodification of cultures and identities: national as well as non-national, non-territorial ones. It was argued that stable national cultures and identities now found it difficult, if not impossible, to constitute themselves in the late 20th century. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, had said already in 1990 that nationalism had 'become historically less important' and that it was 'no longer... a global political programme, as it may be said to have been in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries'.<sup>80</sup>

'Nation' and 'nationalism' are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone analyse, the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described by these words. It is not impossible that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state, without which being English, Irish or Jewish, or a combination of all these, is only one way in which people describe their identity among the many others which they use for this purpose, as occasion demands. It would be absurd to claim that this day is already near. However, I hope it can at least be envisaged. After all, the very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests, as so often, that the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling around nations and nationalism.<sup>81</sup>

Hobsbawm insisted on this line of analysis even in the face of the rise of new nations in the former Eastern Bloc: for him they were but 'The chickens of World War I coming home to roost', a settling of past accounts, frozen by the rise of communism and unfrozen by its fall.<sup>82</sup> This was the verdict of a historian of nations and nationalisms who had remained, throughout, sceptical of their claims and uneasy with their particularising thrust. In part, it said merely that nations and nationalism had ceased to actively remake the map of the world, in effect that the generalisation of the nation-state system was substantially complete. However, it also claimed that nations and nationalisms were declining, albeit gradually.

Hobsbawm's verdict was soon drowned out by less sophisticated reports of the decline of nations and nationalisms under the impact of 'globalisation'.

Benedict Anderson had contested Hobsbawm's verdict in 1991, saying that 'the "end of the era of nationalism", so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.'<sup>83</sup> Now he claimed the opposite. The break-up of the USSR had merely created 'a congeries of weak, economically fragile nation-states out of the debris of the Soviet system, some entirely new, others residues of the settlement of 1918; in either case, from many points of view a quarter of a century too late'. Not only were these nationalisms 'unlikely to disturb global trends', 'Portable nationality, read under the sign of "identity" is on the rapid rise as people everywhere are on the move'.<sup>84</sup> Many older and better-established states under the pressures of globalisation and neoliberalism could also be expected to have their problems: 'States incapable of militarily defending their citizens, and hard put to ensure them employment and ever-better life chances, may busy themselves with policing women's bodies and schoolchildren's curricula, but is this kind of thing enough over the long term to sustain the grand demands of sovereignty?'<sup>85</sup>

Even in the heyday of the discourse of globalisation the lineaments of globalisation as a process, and its connection with the nation-state were not so simple. Many pointed out that the nation-state remained central to the processes of 'globalisation' itself, participating in the construction of its complex international political architecture.<sup>86</sup> Finally, the transition from 'globalisation' to the new 'New Imperialism' may have made states more and not less important in the international order and everywhere the multilateral and transnational advances of the 1990s are in retreat.

Even as the scholarly stampede towards 'globalisation' and the associated 'decline of the nation-state' thesis was in full swing, I was invited to participate in a conference on democracy and civil society in Asia with a contribution on the subject of nationalism. The invitation forced me confront the systematic discrepancies between these ubiquitous diagnoses and the transition, widely noted and puzzled over in India, from the Indian nationalism—broadly egalitarian, 'socialistic', modernising and productivist—of the struggle for independence and of the early decades of independence to the Hindu nationalism, or *Hindutva*—majoritarian, elitist, inegalitarian and subservient to metropolitan capital—which replaced it in the 1980s and 1990s. A long rambling conference paper traced the transition to the contradictions—cultural as well as economic—of the first, and attempted to frame it more generally and theoretically as a transition from developmental nationalism to cultural nationalisms by pointing to similar changes in nationalism elsewhere—whether Japan's *Nihonjinron* discourse or China's return to 'Confucian values'. Eventually it became two separate articles.<sup>87</sup> My own knowledge of other cases being very limited, however, the idea of putting the thesis to a properly comparative test by scholars of other countries and cases slowly germinated. A Fellowship at the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives and a research grant from Canada's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council later, this volume, the result of intensive discussions in two workshops held one year apart, is the result. There is also a broader Indian impetus behind the case made here for studying the culture

and the political economy of nationalism jointly. Political economy had always been central to Indian nationalism, making Indians aware that India may well have a great and even 'glorious' culture, but its celebration took second place to addressing pressing national economic problems and how doing that would change that culture for the (even) better. Indian nationalist thought and Indian economic thought developed, in fact, alongside each other.<sup>88</sup> Indian readers will find many specifically Indian echoes in the pages that follow. Hopefully these will prove illuminating, rather than obscuring, for readers from and concerned about other countries. At least that is the intention. These Indian aspects are so richly evoked by Sumit Sarkar that it is perhaps fitting that his contribution should open this volume.

Although, given our regional specialisation as a group, we focus on the nationalisms of Asia, we imply neither that these developments are confined to Asia, nor bow to the orientalist notion that the nationalisms of Asia are in any essential way distinct from others, nor yet that there is an Asian nationalism. That concept was historically associated with Japanese imperialism and, although it has recently reappeared, its faintness underscores the historical unlikelihood of that prospect. Like all others, the nationalisms of Asia are state-centric and modern but, again like so many others, many of their cultural elements can claim considerable antiquity. A certain Eurocentric convention tends to focus on the artificiality of the boundaries of non-Western, particularly ex-colonial nations and in response there has been a tendency among certain nationalisms to claim ethnic homogeneity. The first claim is beside the point: most nations are cross-cut by and cut across ethnic boundaries, making the task of 'forging' the nation necessary. It is as much a political and economic as a cultural process and it has been performed in most cases well enough. As Martin Bunton shows in the case of a country to which these ideas of 'artificiality' are most often applied, developmental nationalism laid the basis of a viable nation-state whose impending dismemberment, if it happens, will have been because precisely those nation-building and sustaining processes have been dismembered under the Occupation regime. King Feisal was only recalling Massimo D'Azeglio's statement ('We have made Italy, now we must make Italians'), rather than pointing to any non-Western peculiarity of Iraq when he lamented that 'In Iraq, there is still... no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea.'<sup>89</sup> If, similarly, 'maintaining the unity of what had been the Dutch East Indies [did not appear to] be easy. This was not because of unbridgeable "primordial" differences between the various groups that inhabited the islands but because of recent political history. The anti-colonial struggle had included many different kinds of movements, and most had first mobilised on the basis of regional or religious identity.'<sup>90</sup> History, not some primordial ethnicity, was the terrain on which nations were built. Equally, nation-states in Asia are hardly ethnically homogeneous and the management of minorities—ranging from state repression to varying degrees of incorporation—within such states differs as much among Asian states as between any of them and states in other parts of the world.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, as the discussions of cultural nationalisms

in the contributions that follow, and in the concluding summation, suggest, new forms of neoliberal inequality may well be breeding newer minorities. There is little case for treating Asian nationalisms as essentially different from nationalisms in other parts of the world.

However, one would do well to bear in mind the historical specificities of Asia's national modernities. Excepting Japan, they feature the centrality of resistance to colonialism and imperialism. The nationalisms of Asia emerged in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries and Asian nation-states achieved their modern state forms—usually with the attainment of independence from colonialism—around the middle of the 20th century. A third historical specificity is the wide reach of communism in Asia in the 20th century, and the centrality of Asia among the theatres of the Cold War. Asia contains some of the most important instances of states where nationalism and communism have been combined: China and Vietnam in particular. Progressive and effective though these original combinations were, they contributed to the unique horrors of Khmer Cambodia. The interaction of communism and nationalism has also shaped Asia's destiny in the 20th century in a quite different way. Whether in Indonesia or India, Thailand or the Philippines, the containment of communism was a (capitalist) national project with all that this also meant in terms of superpower interventions, non-aligned balancing acts and internal accommodations—a variety of 'third ways'—between capitalism and communism, between the needs of accumulation and legitimation. In West Asia the presence of the communist bloc made room for a degree of national assertion among Arab states against Anglo-American oil interests as well as against Israel and in favour of more or less successful developmental and welfarist national orders.

## Notes

I would like to thank Gregory Blue, Mark Berger, Michael Bodden and Laura Hein for their comments on earlier versions of this introduction, and Henry Heller for his on the penultimate version. Outstanding shortcomings remain my responsibility.

- 1 The idea that nations are 'invented' is at least as old as Renan's 1882 statement that 'Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is essential to the creation of a nation, which is why the advance of historical studies often poses a threat to nationality'. E Renan, *What is a Nation?*, trans Wanda Roemer Taylor, Toronto: Tapir Press, 1996. It is now generally accepted, although, as I show in 'The Inadvertence of Benedict Anderson: a review essay on *Imagined Communities* on the occasion of a new edition', *Global Media and Communications*, 4 (1), 2008, it is usually incorrectly associated with the work of Benedict Anderson.
- 2 While the cultural *matériel* out of which nations are fashioned is often of some antiquity—the rational kernel of the 'primordialist' arguments about nations' antiquity and eternity—as I discuss below, scholars have found it hard to refute the modernity of nations as distinct *forms* of community.
- 3 It is not possible to discuss here why, correspondingly, this division of labour was less consequential for the study of capitalism. Suffice it to point to the rich comparative literature on national forms of capitalism. Of course, this is not enough and the work of theorising a geopolitics of capitalism as a specifically national and international system has only just begun. See, for example, J Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*, London: Verso, 1994; and B Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, London: Verso, 2003.
- 4 The extensive contemporary literature on developmental states is usually traced to the theorists of industrial catch-up of 'late developers', beginning with Carey and List, and with attempts to apply the lessons to developing countries. See F List, *The National System of Political Economy*, Fairfield, NJ: AM Kelly, 1977, first published in 1841; H Carey, *The Past, the Present and the Future*, Philadelphia, PA: Carey and Hart, 1848; and A Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1962. A good overview of the literature on the developmental state can be found in H Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder*, London: Anthem, 2004. I argue, however, that an

- awareness of the importance of national political economy against 'free trade' was more deeply rooted in classical political economy. See R Desai, 'Imperialism', in R Munck & G Honor Fagan (eds), *Globalisation and Security—An Encyclopaedia*, Vol 1, *Economic and Political Aspects* and Vol 2, *Social and Cultural Aspects*, New York: Praeger, 2008.
- 5 Sarkar, in this volume, p 434.
  - 6 See Hein, in this volume, p 449
  - 7 I have argued that the much-contested term 'globalisation' is best used to denote a phase in the management of the USA's declining hegemony rather than any secular economic or technological processes which have, in any case, been of much longer standing than the scope of the term allows. R Desai, 'The last empire? From nation-building compulsion to nation-wrecking futility and beyond', *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (2), 2007, pp 435–456. R Kiely, *Empire in the Age of Globalization: US Hegemony and Neo-liberal Disorder*, London: Pluto, 2005 distinguishes between neoliberalism, globalisation and empire as three distinct phases of a longer neoliberal phase.
  - 8 M Hroch, 'From national movement to fully-formed nation: the nation-building process in Europe', in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, pp 78–97.
  - 9 The exact line between the West and the other is very subjective and depends on whether one believes that the 'wogs begin at Calais' or the Huns at Berlin or draws the line between the worthy and the unworthy elsewhere.
  - 10 See Spencer, in this volume, p 612.
  - 11 A Smith, *Nationalism: Theory Ideology History*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001. The vast bulk of the literature now cited on the subject of nations and nationalism takes their modernity for granted, although for a sympathetic recent treatment of the 'primordialist' thesis associated with social scientists like E Shils and C Geertz and the 'perennialist' thesis of historians like H Seton-Watson, see A D Smith, 'Nationalism', in Smith, *Faces of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1997, ch 3. T Nairn, who produced a historical materialist account of nationalism in *The Break-up of Britain*, London: New Left Books, 1978, inexplicably moved to a position which gave more credence to primordialism and even certain types of racial accounts of nationalism.
  - 12 In a key chapter of his *Thought and Change*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
  - 13 E Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p 1.
  - 14 T Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*, London: NLB, 1977, 1981.
  - 15 These peculiarities were the subject of the famous 'Anderson–Nairn' theses which are resumed in P Anderson, 'Figures of descent', *New Left Review*, I (161), 1987, Nairn discusses the peculiarities of the English nation in a couple of chapters in *The Break-up of Britain* and in *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy*, London: Radius, 1988. One might mention here Benedict Anderson's proposal, made to 'de-Europeanise' the study of nationalism, to date the beginning of nationalism with the 'creole nationalisms' of the Americas. This meant, in effect, the American Revolution: how 'de-Europeanising' this was, let alone how accurate, is debatable. It certainly did not connect nationalism to any political economy, notwithstanding 'print capitalism' (which, for all Anderson's intents and purposes meant little more than the largely cultural role of print). I discuss the fate of this attempt in 'The Inadvertence of Benedict Anderson'.
  - 16 Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, pp 335–336.
  - 17 M Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982, p 175.
  - 18 Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, p 338.
  - 19 Wu, in this issue, p 469.
  - 20 Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, p 340.
  - 21 R Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, p 5.
  - 22 Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, p 41.
  - 23 Rosenberg, *Empire of Civil Society*; and Desai 'Imperialism'.
  - 24 Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, p 265 (emphasis in original).
  - 25 *Ibid*, p 11.
  - 26 *Ibid*, p 12 (emphasis in original).
  - 27 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms*, p 139.
  - 28 *Ibid*, pp 139–140.
  - 29 Bunton, in this issue, p 631–632.
  - 30 GWF Hegel, 'The end of history', in *A Zone of Engagement*, London: Verso, 1992, p 290.
  - 31 *Ibid*.
  - 32 *Ibid*, pp 291–292.
  - 33 E Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983.
  - 34 For a contrary view, see E Nimni, 'Marxism and nationalism', in M Shaw, *Marxist Sociology Revisited: Critical Assessments*, London: Macmillan, 1985, pp 99–142. Nimni's views are hobbled by a rather crude and de-contextualised interpretation of Marx's and Engels' views.

- 35 Engels invoked the notion of ‘history-less peoples’ to analyse the nationalist politics which emerged in the context of the 1848 revolutions. This formulation was succeeded in the work of O Bauer in 1907 by the idea of the ‘awakening of history-less nations’ brought about by the developmental dynamic of capitalism. See T Schiftler, ‘Geschichtslose Völker’, *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, Vol 5, Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 2001, p 459. Compare, for a very similar discounting of nationalism from the liberal side, Lord Acton’s ‘Nationality’, first published in *The Home and Foreign Review*, 1 July 1862, pp 146–174, and reprinted in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*.
- 36 K Marx, *Political Writings II: Surveys from Exile*, New York: Vintage, 1974, p 321.
- 37 *Ibid*, p 323.
- 38 *Ibid*.
- 39 For a fuller discussion, see Desai, ‘The Inadvertence of Benedict Anderson’.
- 40 In his *Nationalism and the Colonial World*, London: Zed, 1986. It was a vain protest. Indeed, one may add that the differentiation made within Indian nationalism between the material and the spiritual realms, which according to Chatterjee is the genius of Indian nationalism, can be found in practically every nationalism which had to assert itself against materially superior, and not necessarily colonial, power—the German as much as the Chinese (on which see Wu in this volume). Spiritual superiority was the only claim available to these nations. Chatterjee’s attempt to claim that an important part of the substance of Indian nationalism—Gandhi’s thought—stood outside Western discourse was disingenuous. Gandhi was a London-educated lawyer with a penchant for anti-industrial romanticism—whether of Ruskin or Tolstoy, as well as a great trust in the efficacy of English Law.
- 41 To structural similarity one may add the uniformising effect of the international order itself: the pressure to conform to established international norms in the regulation of practically all spheres of governance, particular those dealing with reciprocal international relations, whether of trade, finance, migration or participation in international events. No wonder that postage stamps, national airlines, passports, currencies and national anthems all become the standard acquisitions of nationhood. I owe this point to Laura Hein.
- 42 H Heller, *The Bourgeois Revolution in France 1789–1815*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006.
- 43 E Hobsbawm, *Age of Capital*, New York: New American Library, p 10.
- 44 *Ibid*, p 12.
- 45 So much so that, for example, B Davidson’s critique of the elite nature of the African nation-state, *Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-state*, New York: Times Books, 1992, opens with reflections on the opposition between nation and class in the revolutions of 1848. For an excellent critique of Davidson’s rather culturalist argument, see C Leys, ‘Confronting the African tragedy’, *New Left Review*, I (204), 1994, pp 35–47.
- 46 Desai, ‘Imperialism’.
- 47 C Leys, *Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism*, London: Verso, 1989, p 42.
- 48 And it was only a guise: in reality Britain’s industrial development benefited from precisely the sort of state-led, protectionist and quasi-mercantilist policies which characterised the industrial ascent of other countries. See Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder*. There was the separate matter of the dominance of the financial sector of the City of London, which has systematically worked to the detriment of British manufacturing since the 1870s. On this, see G Ingham, *Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social Development*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984; A Gamble, *Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State*, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994; and Leys, *Politics in Britain*.
- 49 J Hobson’s 1902 *Imperialism: A Study*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1965, was the earliest. Though not strictly Marxist, it formed the backdrop against which the classical Marxist tradition theorised imperialism in this period. It was followed by R Hilferding’s 1910 *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981; R Luxemburg’s 1913 *The Accumulation of Capital*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951; Lenin’s 1916 *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, New York: International Publishers, 1939; N Bukharin’s 1918 *Imperialism and the World Economy*, New York: H Fertig, 1966; and J Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, New York: AM Kelly, 1951. See also Desai, ‘Imperialism’.
- 50 R Tucker (ed), *The Lenin Anthology*, New York: Norton, 1975, p 206.
- 51 C Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983; and J Joll, *The Second International 1889–1914*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.
- 52 J Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, p 60.
- 53 K Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, New York: Octagon Books, 1975.
- 54 A Mayer, *Wilson vs Lenin: The Political Origin of the New Diplomacy*, New York: Meridian Books, 1963, p 353.
- 55 *Ibid*, p 229.
- 56 O Bauer, ‘The nation’, in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*; and A Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1971.

- 57 Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p 240.
- 58 *Ibid*, pp 236–241.
- 59 *Ibid*, p 274; Gramsci ‘Notes on Italian history’, in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*; and Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, New York: International Publishers, 1983, pp 28–51.
- 60 Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, pp 131–133.
- 61 *Ibid*, p 418.
- 62 *Ibid*.
- 63 R Suny, ‘Incomplete revolution: national movements and the collapse of the Soviet Empire’, *New Left Review*, 189, 1991, p 112. See also his *Revenge of the Past*; and T Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- 64 P Lawrence discusses how much Nazism skewed inter-war debates about nationalism in his *Nationalism: History and Theory*, London: Pearson Education, 2006, pp 59–106.
- 65 H Kohn, ‘The genesis and character of English nationalism’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1, 1940.
- 66 Nairn, ‘The modern Janus’, in the second expanded edition of *The Break-up of Britain*, London: Verso, 1981.
- 67 E Gellner, *The Enchanted Glass*, London: Pan Books, 1988, pp 134–135.
- 68 Wu, in this volume, p 10.
- 69 Suny, *The Revenge of the Past*.
- 70 M Lewin, *Soviet Century*, London: Verso, 2004.
- 71 D Chandler, ‘International justice’, in D Archibugi (ed), *Debating Cosmopolitics*, London: Verso, 2003, p 30.
- 72 *Ibid*, emphasis added.
- 73 E Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London: Hutchinson, 1961; K Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953; and R Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964.
- 74 E Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 4.
- 75 M Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- 76 Although this notion is usually credited to Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, it must really be attributed to E Hobsbawm & T Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. See Desai, ‘The inadvertence of Benedict Anderson’.
- 77 Key early works include K Jayawardene, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1982; J Liddle & R Joshi, *Daughters of Independence*, London: Zed, 1986; and N Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*, London: Sage, 1997. Moghissi’s own *Populism and Feminism in Iran*, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994 is a critical part of this tradition.
- 78 G Eley & R Suny, ‘Introduction’, in Eley & Suny (eds), *Becoming National*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p 21.
- 79 Suny, *The Revenge of the Past*, p 158.
- 80 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p 191.
- 81 *Ibid*, pp 182–183.
- 82 E Hobsbawm, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today’, in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*.
- 83 B Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991, p 3.
- 84 B Anderson, ‘Introduction’, in Balakrishnan, *Mapping the Nation*, p 8.
- 85 *Ibid*, p 9.
- 86 See R Dore & S Berger (eds), *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; and L Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- 87 R Desai, ‘From national bourgeoisies to rogues, failures and bullies: the contradictions of 21st century imperialism and the unravelling of the Third World’, *Third World Quarterly*, 25 (1), 2004, pp 169–185; and Desai, ‘Nation against democracy: the rise of cultural nationalism in Asia’, in F Quadir & J Lele (eds), *Democracy and Civil Society in Asia*, Vol I, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp 81–110. A later piece, ‘Neo-liberalism and cultural nationalism: a danse macabre’, in D Plehwe, B Walpen & G Nuenhoeffer (eds), *Neo-liberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp 222–235 is also of interest.
- 88 See, for example, A Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1954; and B Ganguly, *Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives*, New Delhi: Tata-McGraw-Hill, 1977.
- 89 Quoted in Bunton, this volume, p 635.
- 90 Barker, in this volume, p 528.
- 91 D Denoon, *et al* (eds), *Multi-cultural Japan: Paleolithic to Postmodern*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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